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The Development of Outer
Continental Shelf Energy Resources
G. KEVIN JONES*
An important source of oil and gas that has sparked much recent debate
is the outer continental shelf (OCS). This article traces the history of the
development of OCS energy resources as well as the official policies under-
lying federal governmental actions affecting the OCS. It also spotlights the
basic conflict in terms of environmental concerns between coastal states
and the federal government regarding their desired roles in the process of
controlling OCS development.
There are those who have tried to cast [Outer Continental Shelf] activi-
ties as a choice between either oil and gas, or protection of other impor-
tant values. Experience in the Gulf of Mexico in Federal and State
waters, and off southern California in Federal and State waters, shows it
is not an either/or question. Offshore energy activities do not preclude a
healthy environment, and are, indeed, quite compatible with other ocean
uses.
1
* B.S. 1974, Brigham Young University; J.D. 1977, J. Rueben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University. Member Utah State Bar. Attorney, Office of
the Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior.
This article is an expression of the author's personal opinions and does not nec-
essarily reflect the opinions, policies or positions of the Department of the Interior
or its offices. The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation kindly provided a
grant to aid in the research.
1. OCS Oversight-Part 2: Hearings on OCS Oversight and Related Issues, the
National OCS Program, and the Five- Year OCS Leasing Program Before the Sub-
comm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1981) (statement of Inte-
rior Secretary James G. Watt) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight Hearings-Part
2].
I. INTRODUCTION
An important element of the Reagan administration's energy
policy2 is the reduction of domestic dependence on foreign energy
supplies through rigorous development of oil and gas resources
on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).3 To accelerate the devel-
opment of the nation's offshore energy potential, former Secretary
of the Interior James Watt on July 21, 1982, approved a leasing
schedule that will offer almost the entire OCS for exploration and
development. 4 The new schedule, replacing the June 1980 final
leasing schedule approved by former Interior Secretary Cecil An-
drus,5 will offer for lease nearly one billion acres of federal OCS
lands during the five year period from August 1982 to June 1987,
2. There were two changes in the energy situation in the 1970's that can be
identified as elements of the current energy crisis. First, energy prices began to
rise at a substantial rate. Second, the United States began importing a large per-
centage of its energy sources from foreign suppliers. Holcombe, Causes of the En-
ergy Crisis, 29 OIL AND GAS TAX Q. 139-40 (1980). For a discussion on the history
of U.S. energy policy, see Nash, Energy Crisis in Historical Perspective, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 341 (1981); and Goodwin, Energy: 1945-1980, 1978 WILSON Q. 55.
3. Final Five-Year Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf: Hearings to Review the Secretary of the Interior's Proposed Five-Year
Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf Pursuant to the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy Conservation and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982) (statement of Interior Secretary James G.
Watt) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan];
Minerals Management Service, United States Dep't of the Interior, News Release
(July 21, 1982) [hereinafter cited as News Release (July 21, 1982) ].
The outer continental shelf is the submerged lands on the continental margins
of the United States which are subject to federal jurisdiction (see Figure 1 for a
diagrammatic profile of the OCS region). These lands lie outside the three-mile
zone of coastal submerged lands which are reserved by the states. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976).
4. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 3; Senate Hearings on the Five-
Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Senator Lowell Weicker).
The offshore leasing plan became final in July 1982, after 19 months of consulta-
tion between the Department of the Interior and the 23 affected states. The ad-
ministrative record contains 5,000 pages and reflects participation by local
governments, environmental groups, industry, and the public. The effort has been
described by Secretary Watt as "the most comprehensive, exhaustive project in
the [Interior] Department's history." Senate Hearings on the Five- Year OCS Leas-
ing Plan, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Interior Secretary James G. Watt): News
Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 3.
With Congress unwilling to seriously consider legislation to abolish the Energy
Department or hasten decontrol of natural gas prices, Interior Secretary Watt's
controversial program to rapidly accelerate the pace of federal OCS leasing has
gained new importance. The plan is the only active element of the Reagan admin-
istration's energy policy. A Quiet Point Man for Oil Leasing, Bus. Week, Aug. 30,
1982, at 75.
5. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR JAMES G. WATr's FIVE-YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING
PLAN FOR THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 5 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited
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compared to fifty-five million acres under the Carter administra-
tion's proposal.6
The approved program schedules forty-one sales over the five
year period. One billion acres, divided into 18 planning areas
ranging in size from 8 million to 133 million acres, will be consid-
ered. In contrast, past lease sales covered about two million
acres. 7 One-half of the new acreage to be offered will be in
Alaska's OCS.8
The Department of ithe Interior plans for accelerated offshore
oil exploration have received extensive criticism from coastal
as HOUSE REPORT ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN]; Watt Puts One Billion
Acres of U.S. Coast Up for Bids, Deseret News, July 22, 1982, at Al.
Changes in the leasing schedule are authorized by § 18 of the OCS Lands Act
Amendments of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456-1456(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), 43 U.S.C,
§§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (Supp. V 1981), which states that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior shall annually review and periodically revise the OCS leasing program. 43
U.S.C. § 1344(a), (e) (Supp. V 1981).
6. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 14
(statement of Interior Secretary James G. Watt); Watt Puts One Billion Acres of
U.S. Coast Up for Bids, supra note 5; News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 3.
This amounts to twenty times as much acreage as offered under the Andrus plan,
and twenty-five times as much as offered from the entire period of 1953, when the
program began, to 1980. HOUSE REPORT ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN,
supra note 5, at 6; Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra
note 3, at 1 (statement of Senator Lowell Weicker).
The exact size of the United States outer continental shelf has not been estab-
lished. Area estimates provided by the Department of the Interior range from
about 800 million to over one billion acres. OCS Oversight-Part 1: Hearings on
Provisions of the OCSLA Concerning Interrelationships of Federal and State Gov-
ernments in the Deci.sionmaking Process and the Importance of the OCS on the
Coastal Zone, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) [hereinafter cited as OCS Oversight
Hearings-Part 11. For the purpose of this article, a reasonable estimate of the
federal OCS areas out to a depth of 2,500 meters is about one billion acres (965.8
million acres). COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS, ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT 3-4 (EMD 81-59) (Mar. 26, 1981) [hereinafter cited as ISSUES IN
LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS]. 'This area is equal in size to roughly half the United
States land mass." HOUSE REPORT ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 5, at 6 n.19.
7. Watt Puts One Billion Acres of U.S. Coast Up for Bids, supra note 5; News
Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 3. Twelve sales are scheduled in the Gulf of
Mexico, sixteen off Alaska, four in California, and eight in the Atlantic. One reof-
fering sale will be held in which all tracts not previously leased will become avail-
able. The final leasing program approved by Secretary Andrus in June 1980,
scheduled thirty-six sales over the five-year period of 1980 through 1985. Eleven
sales were scheduled off the Gulf of Mexico, six in the Atlantic, four off of Califor-
nia, and ten in offshore Alaska. Five reoffering sales were also scheduled. HOUSE
REPORT ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 5, at 5.
8. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 21
(statement of Interior Secretary James G. Watt).
states, local governments, environmentalists, and citizen groups. 9
Several suits have been filed against the plan in the federal
courts.10 For example, the state of California opposed the acceler-
ated OCS leasing program, particularly lease sale number fifty-
three in the Santa Maria Basin." The proposed drilling there
would occur near four of northern California's most beautiful
beaches, but would only produce a ten-day national supply of pe-
troleum.12 As a result, congressional and other political sources
9. The OCS program is one of the most controversial programs initiated by
former Secretary Watt. The plan has been referred to as "radical, irresponsible,
extremist, and wasteful." Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan,
supra note 3, at 7. The Secretary's plans for accelerated offshore energy leasing
were likely to be delayed by escalating criticism of the Interior Secretary himself.
Pasztor, Rising Criticism of Watt is Likely to Delay His Plans for Accelerated En-
ergy Leasing, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1983, at 6, col. 1; Pasztor, Watt Softens His Lines,
But Image As Extremist Cuts His Effectiveness, Wall St. J., June 2, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
One of the most important results of the political controversy surrounding for-
mer Secretary Watt is that "too much of the recent environmental debate has
been focused on the personality of the Secretary of Interior instead of the real is-
sues involved. This is unfortunate. Policies must be evaluated on the basis of rel-
ative costs and benefits, not on the personal style of the policymaker." Temporary
Surplus Doesn't Mean Oil Development in U.S. Can be Deferred, Oil & Gas J., May
2, 1983, at 71.
10. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), a ffd in part and rev'd
in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (in suit brought by State of California and
agencies thereof charging that the defendants violated federal statutes in offering
for competitive bidding certain oil and gas leases on tracts in outer continental
shelf, court held that Secretary of the Interior violated Coastal Zone Management
Act by selling leases without determination of consistency with state coastal zone
management plan); see infra notes 353-58 and accompanying text; California v.
Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (in reviewing oil and gas leasing program to
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Acts, court held that Secretary Watt erred in: (1)
failing to identify lease locations with greater specificity; (2) failing to consider the
need to share developmental benefits and environmental risks among various
OCS regions; (3) failing to reconsider relative environmental sensitivity and
marine productivity in OCS areas; (4) failing to base timing and location of leasing
on standards set forth in statute and failing to strike a balance of environmental
coastal zone factors; and (5) failing to qualify environmental costs to the extent
that they were quantifiable and to adequately explain his determination of net
economic value); California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (after remand of
668 F.2d 1290, court held on appeal that Secretary of the Interior's revised program
had corrected the defects mentioned above).
11. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359. See supra note 10.
12. The controversy is illustrated by the remarks of California Congressman
John Burton:
So it is obvious that lock, stock and barrel he (Secretary Watt) is in the
pocket of the oil industry, he is going to destroy the fishing industry in our
area, he is going to destroy the ecology of our area, and he is going to do it
all in the name of-I do not know what, but I am sure he can think of
something.
I think it is outrageous exploitation. ...
OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 6, at 10 (statement of Congressman
John Burton).
California Congressman Paul McCloskey, however, questioned the environ-
mentalist's perspective on the lease sale.
[T Ihe protection of one of the most beautiful coastlines in the world is im-
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have also opposed the direction of the OCS leasing program in
California.13 On March 19, 1981, twenty-nine members of the Cali-
portant, but just as serious is the national need to avoid the necessity of
going to war in the Persian Gulf .
I want to confess that in comparing these two perspectives the de-
sire to prevent going to war in the Middle East and to prevent spending an
additional $38 million in increased defense expenditures, outweighs the
possibility of having to .say as a Representative from California, yes, we
are willing to go to war to protect our source of oil, but we are not willing
to drill off our own coast because of a desire to protect our own environ-
ment. The standard environmentalist's perspective on the lease-sale
seems a little hollow unless we have clear evidence that the danger of
drilling represents a real danger of environmental damage to the coast.
Offshore Leasing: Department of the Interior Oversight Before the Subcomm. on
Government Operations of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1981) (statement of Congressman Paul McCloskey) [hereinafter cited as Offshore
Leasing Hearings ].
Another challenge to the environmentalist's view of OCS development off the
California coast was the testimony of Mr. Wallace Stokes, a private citizen, before
a House subcommittee hearing on OCS oversight.
Individuals and representatives of organizations have appeared before
you today representing almost every creature of the deep in California's
vast off-shore inventory of sea life, but who has spoken for man? We
speak of protecting man's environment and yet ignore the fact that man is
a social being. An economics guided and energy-consuming creature that
is a very important component of the world's total environment. Today I
appear before you as a private citizen attempting to speak for man, partic-
ularly the sector of our citizenry who are the urban poor.
On behalf of the urban poor, Mr. Stokes stated:
It is all well and good for those coastline residents to express concerns
for preservation of the unique beauty and environment, but it is of little
value and absolutely no help to that automobile worker in Milpitas thrown
out of a job because of rising energy costs. We can talk about environ-
mental protection for the whale, but it doesn't address the very real
human need of the San Francisco Tenderloin resident and her inability to
maintain an adequate diet because of escalating energy costs.
Assuming for the moment that the USGS estimates are correct, the oil
in leasehold 53 is projected to make 10,000 jobs. Can we neglect this im-
pact on [the] unemployed in this Nation?
Offshore Leasing Hearings, s-upra note 12, at 434-35 (statement of Mr. Wallace
Stokes, private citizen).
13. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 12, at 373.
The United States Geological Survey estimated that lease sale 53 has a potential
of 983 million barrels of petroleum. Opponents of the sale maintained that this
amount did not justify the environmental risks of offshore drilling. Id. Industry,
however, displayed unusual interest in the petroleum potential of the Santa Maria
Basin. The sale drew $2.278 billion in high bids. The offers included one that es-
tablished a record for the largest bonus for a single tract, as well as the highest
per-acre bonus. Rintoui, California's Staggering Sale, Offshore, July 1981, at 57.
Phillips Petroleum Company and Chevron U.S.A., a subsidiary of Standard Oil
Company of California, paid a record $333.6 million for the right to drill for oil on a
single 5,700-acre offshore tract in the Santa Maria Basin off Point Arguello, Califor-
fornia congressional delegation wrote President Reagan asking
him to overturn Secretary Watt's action and exclude four other
northern California basins-Eel River, Point Arena, Bodega, and
Santa Cruz-from OCS leasing.14
In response to California's argument that the environmental
risks of offshore drilling were too great for the amount of petro-
leum to be found in sale number fifty-three, former Secretary
Watt replied that the risks are extremely limited and "directly as-
sociated with the quantity of oil found. Small or no discoveries of
oil result in virtually no risk. A theoretically higher risk would oc-
cur only if larger quantities of oil are found. And if that is the
case, the value of iroduction to the Nation substantially
increases.' 5
Former Secretary Watt maintained that a far bigger danger to
the coastal environment than the development of OCS energy re-
sources was the risk of oil spills from giant tankers carrying for-
eign oil into the United States.1 6 Watt also pointed out that
California conducted numerous lease sales within state waters at
the same time it opposed federal OCS lease sales.' 7 He further
nia. Test drilling in the Santa Maria Basin confirmed the existence of a major
oilfield, and experts now predict that the Santa Maria Basin could be .the largest
single American oil discovery since Alaska's Prudhoe Bay in 1968. Originally, the
field's potential reserves were estimated at 100 million barrels of oil. Since the test
drilling, however, projections have risen to put the ultimate potential between 300
million barrels of oil and one billion barrels of oil. Black-Gold Rush, Time, Nov. 29,
1982, at 63; A Billion-Barrel Find?, Newsweek, Nov. 29, 1982, at 84; Rintoul, Califor-
nia Offshore Enters New Era, Offshore, Feb., 1982, at 57.
14. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 1, supra note 6, at 8-9 (statement of Con-
gressman John Burton).
15. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 12, at 516-17 (statement of Interior
Secretary James G. Watt).
16. U.S. News & World Rep., May 25, 1981, at 49; OCS Oversight Hearings-Part
2, supra note 1, at 97.
In an extensive study, the Congressional Research Service concluded that "off-
shore OCS production will be less damaging to the environment than importing a
like amount of petroleum." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., A STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATU-
RAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE 1 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZONE I.
Most oil pollution in the oceans comes from vessels, especially tankers,
and from waste oil in municipal and industrial effluents. A five-percent re-
duction in oil pollution from either of these sources would have a more
positive impact on the marine environment than elimination of all off-
shore production. Transportation (tankers primarily) contributes an esti-
mated 35 percent of all ocean oil pollution. River and urban runoff
contributes 31 percent, and offshore production 1.3 percent.
EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE COASTAL ZONE,
supra.
17. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 21
(statement of Interior Secretary James G. Watt). The Secretary stated in congres-
sional testimony that:
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noted that California is the largest gas consuming state in the na-
tion and, therefore, has a responsibility to meet its own consumer
petroleum needs as well as contribute to the energy supply of the
country 18
If the United States were "to operate on a principle that every
time you drill a well it has to carry the potential of carrying the
entire Nation for months on end, there would be no drilling at
all."19 Our national supply of petroleum comes from thousands of
leases across the country, each contributing its own share of pro-
duction. Interior officials maintain that exempting offshore tracts
from OCS development has resulted in the steady decline of oil
production from OCS lands.2 0 Former Secretary Watt, therefore,
While criticizing us, Califorma has been properly issuing hundreds of
drilling permits within State waters. In fact, since 1979, Governor Brown
has been issuing offshore oil drilling permits in the Santa Barbara Chan-
nel. It must be remembered that the California leases are within three
miles of the coastline and the beaches. The State's activities are what you
see; the Federal activities affect the lands far out under the ocean waters.
Id.
18. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 56 (statement of Interior
Secretary James G. Watt).
19. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 12, at 373.
20. OCS Oversight Hearngs-Part 2, supra note 1, at 234 (statement of J.
Robinson West, Assistant Secretary. for Policy, Budget, and Administration,
United States Department of the Interior). Annual OCS oil production declined
from 418 million barrels of oil in 1971 to 277 million barrels in 1980, a 33% decrease.
Id. at 234, 239.
Table One
TOTAL UNITED STATES AND OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF PRODUCTION
CRUDE OIL AND CONDENSATE
PRODUCTION NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
(millions of barrels) (trillions of cubic feet)
OCS % OCS %
Year TOTAL U.S. TOTAL OCS OF U.S.* TOTAL U.S. TOTAL OCS OF U.S.*
1953 2,357 1 .1 8.4 ** 0.2
1957 2,617 16 .6 10.7 0.1 0.8
1960 2,575 50 1.9 12.8 0.3 2.1
1964 2,787 123 4.4 15.5 0.6 4.0
1968 3,329 267 8.1 19.3 1.5 7.9
1972 3,456 412 11.9 22.5 3.0 13.5
1976 2,976 317 10.7 20.0 3.6 18.0
1980 3,137 277 8.8 20.1 4.6 23.1
* Percentages are computed on unrounded figures.
** Less than 0.5 trillion cubic feet.
CONSERVATION DIVISION, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF STATISTICS 1953-1980, 92 (1981).
claimed that the national interest involved in developing offshore
oil and gas reserves goes beyond state objections to offshore drill-
ing under the Department of the Interior's OCS program.21
The intergovernmental tension over the direction of OCS leas-
ing will continue as the program implements former Secretary
Watt's new procedures. To facilitate understanding of that ten-
sion, this study will discuss the historical development of the con-
tinental shelf concept and examine the statutory and legal
framework for OCS development within our federal system. Of
special note will be the opportunities for coastal state involve-
ment in federal offshore leasing decision-making. Finally, the
streamlined OCS leasing program initiated by former Secretary
Watt will be discussed.
II. THE UNITED STATES ENERGY SITUATION
The world has experienced two major oil price disasters in the
last decade. The first was a sharp increase in the price of oil
which occurred in 1973-74 and was the result of an oil embargo im-
posed by the Arab oil-producing nations.22 The second increase
occurred in 1979, following the Iranian revolution and the subse-
quent reduction in Iranian oil exports.23 In just eight years, the
world price of oil rose from roughly $3 per barrel to more than $35
per barrel, for an average annual increase of 31% per year.24 The
21. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 12, at 517 (statement of Interior Sec-
retary James G. Watt). The Secretary explained:
The overriding national interest dictates that the OCS exploration pro-
gram be carried on. We must know the resources at hand. This is recog-
nized by congressional action and by statute. The criticism raised to date
simply does not balance the very small risks as compared to potential
value of the likely production. Sale 53 is a step in implementing the intent
of Congress to meet the overriding national need to increase domestic oil
and gas production. There can be no increase in production until we know
if it is there.
Id.
22. Levy, The Years that the Locust Hath Eaten: Oil Policy andOPEC Develop-
ment Prospects, 57 FOREIGN AIT. 287 (1978-1979); Serafy, The Oil Price Revolution
of 1973-1974, 4 J. OF ENERGY & DEv. 273 (1979); Singer, My Turn: Hope for the En-
ergy Shortage, Newsweek, May 18, 1981, at 32.
23. Levy, Oil and the Decline of the West, 58 FOREIGN Ari. 999 (1980); Singer,
supra note 22, at 32.
24. Byron, A Brave New Energy World, Time, April 19, 1982, at 60; Ortiz, 1982
Realities of the Oil Market: Can OPEC Retain its Ability to Fix Oil Prices?, 7 J. OF
ENERGY & DEV. 13 (1981); Sheets, How OPEC Shot Itself in the Foot, U.S. News &
World Rep., Oct. 18, 1982, at 60 [hereinafter cited as Sheets].
The rapid increase in the cost of petroleum has produced an unsettling effect on
the OPEC nations. The "new wealth has compromised the old social institutions
and promoted a dangerous reliance on foreign money, labor, and know-how."
Pipes, The Middle East: The Curse of Oil Wealth, Atlantic, July 1982, at 19 [herein-
after cited as Pipes]. Oil wealth brings major problems to developing countries,
including inflation, corruptions and an artificial economy. The traditional eco-
[Vol. 11: 9, 1983] Shelf Energy Resources
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United States, and most of the world, was caught in a serious en-
ergy crisis, characterized as "the greatest peacetime domestic
problem in our history."25
Current domestic consumption of petroleum and petroleum
products is down. There is a world-wide glut of oil caused by a
global economic slowdown that has curbed the demand for en-
ergy, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) escalation of prices which has produced unprecedented
conservation by the consuming countries. 26
nomic base of farming or manufacturing industry is frequently neglected in an
economy that encourages high wages and the services of middlemen. Sampson,
The Awful Curse of Oil, Newsweek, Sept. 20, 1982, at 58. Oil billions, create an un-
realistic economic environment in which governments seek to satisfy public ex-
pectations by subsidizing social services with unearned money. "Large
government subsidies [also] shield industry from the hazards of competition and
contribute to business mismanagement and labor inefficiency." Pipes, supra, at
20. For a further discussion on the problems oil wealth brings to developing coun-
tries, see Amuzegar, Oil Wealth: A Very Mixed Blessing, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 814
(1982).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1214, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 1214]. While the unprecedented price increase in OPEC imported
oil had a significant impact on the economics of Western nations, it had a devastat-
ing effect on the non-oil producing third world countries. For these countries,
higher oil prices immediately worsened their foreign accounts. For the year 1981,
the foreign debt of non-oil developing countries, mostly due to the high cost of
their oil imports, was over $4 00 billion. The importance of high oil prices to the
non-oil third world payments deficits is illustrated by the fact that in three of the
last four years of the 1970's, three-quarters of the non-oil developing countries defi-
cits were with OPEC nations. In 1972 only Brazil, among non-oil third world coun-
tries, had more than 10% of its total import bill due to oil. In 1974, just two years
later, 21 developing nations had more than 10% of their imports allotted to foreign
oil. Hallwood & Sinclair, OPEC's Developing Relationships with the Third World,
58 IN'T AFF. 270 (1982). See aiso Dunkerley & Steinfeld, Adjustment to Higher Oil
Prices in Oil-Importing Developing Countries, 5 J. OF ENERGY & DEV. 194 (1980);
Scharrer, Burdens of Debt and the New Protectionism, in GLOBAL INSECuRIrY: A
STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND ECONomic RENEWAL 290-319 (D. Yergin & M. Hillen-
brand eds. 1982); Lowinger, Petroleum Production in Developing Countries:
Problems and Prospects, 7 J. OF ENERGY & DEV. 225 (1982).
26. Pauly, Turning Tables on OPEC, Newsweek, May 25, 1981, at 64; Sheets,
supra note 24, at 60. The world-wide oil glut and decline in oil prices have led
some commentators to predict "the end of the OPEC era." See Tussing, An OPEC
Obituary, 70 THE PUB. INTEREST 3-21 (1983); The Crumbling of the Cartel, News-
week, Mar. 21, 1983, at 57. Saudi Arabia has reduced its oil production from 10 mil-
lion barrels a day to less than four million recently. Friedman, What Price Oil?,
Newsweek, Mar. 21, 1983, at 62.
While declining oil prices are good news for consumers, a sudden drop in oil
prices would be disruptive to the world economy. Dramatic price cuts would elim-
inate any chance that Third World oil producers such as Mexico, Venezuela, and
Nigeria could pay off their enormous international debts. The defaults would sig-
nificantly disrupt the international banking system and damage Western banks.
The United States, however, still faces critical energy supply
and payment problems. In 1982, petroleum consumption in this
country was 15.3 million barrels per day,27 28%28 (or five million
Oil producing countries are dependent upon oil revenues to finance domestic
projects. As these revenues decline, OPEC nations withdraw their holdings in
Western banks, thereby reducing available capital and keeping the cost of borrow-
ing (interest rates) high. Did the Banks Blow It?, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1983, at 64;
Oil Prices Hit the Skids, Newsweek, Jan. 24, 1983, at 54; A Split in OPEC: Cheaper
Oil Ahead, Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1983, at 50. Latin American nations have discussed
the formation of a "debtor's cartel" to manage the region's $310 billion debt. Pro-
posals under consideration include demands to renegotiate loans, and even repu-
diation of their enormous debts. Birth of a Borrower's Cartel?, Newsweek, Sept. 5,
1983, at 56.
The drop in oil prices has devastated the economy of poor oil-producing coun-
tries like Nigeria. In the prosperous period of Nigeria's oil boom, foreign workers
were welcomed. When oil prices fell in 1982, however, the Nigerian economy
crashed and unemployment became a national problem. With presidential elec-
tions forthcoming, President Shagari turned on the foreign workers residing in Ni-
geria as a ready and popular scapegoat for the nation's economic ills. The
Nigerian government gave two million foreign workers two weeks to leave the
country. Ghana was the hardest hit of all the West African nations, being forced
to absorb one million returnees-an increase in the country's population of 10%
almost overnight. Nigeria's Outcasts: The Cruel Exodus, Newsweek, Feb. 14, 1983,
at 32.
Lower petroleum prices have also affected United States energy producers.
Lower profits have forced United States oil companies to reduce exploration and
lay off oil field workers. The curtailment of exploration activities in turn affects
the business of hundreds of oil field suppliers and oil-services companies. Hughes
Tool Company, manufacturers of drilling bits, has laid off 25% of its work force.
Perhaps the most significant impact of dropping oil prices is the cancellation of ex-
pensive projects to develop alternative energy sources. One petroleum expert has
observed that "the oil fields of the 1990's are not going to be developed-the ex-
pense is just too great." Oil Prices Hit the Skids, Newsweek, Jan. 24, 1983, at 45, 55.
See also A Split in OPEC. Cheaper Oil Ahead, Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1983, at 50; The
Unrigging of Oil Prices, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1983, at 62; and The Dangers of Compla-
cency, Newsweek, Sept. 12, 1983, at 57.
However, the decline in the cost of energy has assisted the economic recovery in
the United States. For every $1 drop in the price of oil, economists calculated the
United States will save $1.8 billion. The Unrigging of Oil Prices, Newsweek, Mar. 7,
1983, at 65. Third World oil-importing nations will also benefit from lower oil
prices. Debt-ridden Brazil will save $260 million on its annual import bill from
each $1 decline in the price of oil. "Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. estimates that
every $% increase in imports by the industrial countries translates into an in-
crease of as much as 5% for the twelve largest non-oil-exporting nations in the
Third World." A Split in OPEC: Cheaper Oil Ahead, Newsweek, Feb. 7,1983, at 53-
54.
27. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMin., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1982 AN-
NuAL ENERGY REVIEW 47 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 ANNUAL ENERGY RE-
VIEW]. Table two provides a look at the consumption of refined petroleum
products by the United States in selected past years.
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barrels) 29 was imported, and it is projected that net imports of oil
will rise to seven million barrels a day in 1985 and remain at this
level until 1990.30 The United States, which accounted for more
than 35% of total world oil consumption in 1979, is projected to re-
main the largest single user of oil in the free world, consuming
30% of the total in 1990.31 In 1982, the United States net oil import
payments were $63 billion;32 it has been estimated that import
payments in 1990 will be approximately $75 to $79 billion.33
This level of imports has been a significant factor in the recent
recession and has presented a major obstacle to the nation's eco-
nomic recovery.34 The nation's dependence on foreign sources of
Table Two
UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION, IMPORT, AND VALUE OF PETROLEUM
Total Consumption of Total Value
refined Petroleum Fossil Fuel
Products Total Petroleum Imports Imports (Billion
Year (Million Barrels per Day) (Million Barrels per Day) Current Dollars)
1952 7.3 1.0 0.7
1957 8.8 1.6 1.6
1962 10.4 2.1 1.9
1967 12.6 2.5 2.5
1972 16.4 4.7 4.7
1977 18.4- 8.8 44.2
1982* 15.3 5.0 62.8
* Preliminary
Id. at 25, 51, 65.
28. Id. at v. United States petroleum imports in 1982 decreased by 16% from
the 1981 level. Id. at 1. The United States received 42% of its petroleum imports
directly from OPEC. Id. at v.
29. 1982 ANNUAL ENEIRGY REVIEW, supra note 27, at 47. Table two (supra note
27) shows the volume of petroleum imports made by the United States in selected
past years.
30. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1982 AN-
NUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK XV-XVi (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK].
31. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1980 AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1980 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS]. For a discussion on the energy outlook in the future, see generally
Brodman & Moore, The Outlook for World Oil Supply and Demand Through 1983, 7
J. OF ENERGY & DEV. 1 (19131); STOBAUGH, WORLD ENERGY TO THE YEAR 2000, in
GLOBAL INSECURrrY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL 29-57
(1982).
32. 1982 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 27, at 25. Table two (supra note
27) illustrates the value of fossil fuels imported by the United States in selected
past years.
33. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 17.
34. In announcing the proposal to accelerate the OCS leasing schedule, Secre-
petroleum makes the nation vulnerable to another oil embargo,
threatens the maintenance of a favorable international balance of
payments, and risks national security.35 Increased domestic dis-
covery and production of oil and gas will reduce the nation's de-
pendence on foreign sources of petroleum.
The OCS has been called "America's best hope for finding addi-
tional oil and gas resources and reducing our dependence on for-
eign oi1."36 Geologically, the continental shelf is the submerged
extension of the continental land mass lying immediately adja-
cent to the shoreline and extending outward into the ocean for a
distance that can range from nearly zero to more than 800 miles. 37
The continental shelf has an average depth of 425 feet, and ex-
tends an average distance of forty miles offshore. The continental
shelf is expected to have the best potential for the discovery of
commercially exploitable deposits of oil and gas. 38 Fifty-five to
seventy percent of the United States and world offshore petro-
leum resources are estimated to lie under water depths of less
than 200 meters. Furthermore, most of these resources are ex-
pected to lie shoreward of the base of the continental slope or
within 200 nautical miles from shore. Only 2% of all offshore pe-
troleum resources are estimated to extend beyond the continental
rise in the deep ocean. 39
Beneath the 1.1 million square miles of United States offshore
tary Watt explained that the -development of offshore oil and gas resources is a
vital part of the Reagan adminsitration's energy and economic program." Office of
the Secretary, United States Dep't of the Interior, News Release (Apr. 16, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as News Release (Apr. 16, 1981)1.
For a general discussion on the impact of oil prices, see generally Chenergy, Re-
structuring the World Economy: Round II, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 1102 (1981); YEARGIN,
AMERICA IN THE STRAIT OF STRINGENCY, GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR EN-
ERGY AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL 94-137 (1982).
35. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1460 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 5901.
For a general discussion on the risks to United States national security
presented by continued dependence on foreign oil, see Moore, Foreign Policy
Dimensions of the Crisis in Oil, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 111 (1980); SMART, ENERGY/AND
THE POWER OF NATIONS, GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND .Eco-
NOMIC RENEWAL 349-74 (1982).
36. 124 CONG. REC. 27,262 (1978) (statement of Senator Jackson). See also
Krueger & Singer, An Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909 & n.1 (1979).
37. C. Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments, 53 U.S. NAVAL
WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 12, 17 (1961). See also Comment, The Interaction of the Law
and Technology; The Continental Shelf Problem, I CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49, 53 (1968).
38. Geologically, the seabed is divided into four distinct areas: the continental
shelf, continental slope, continental rise, and the abyssal plain or deep-seabed.
The shelf, slope, and rise form the continental margin. Franssen, Oil and Gas in
the Oceans, 61 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 388, 389-90 (1980). See Figure One
for a diagrammatic profile of the continental margin.
39. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, OCEAN PETROLEUM RESOURCES 16-17 (1975).
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lands potentially available for oil and gas development, there ex-
ists an enormous quantity of energy resources. The United States
Geological Survey estimates that the United States OCS contains
undiscovered recoverable resources of 17 to 44 billion barrels of
oil and 117 to 231 trillion cubic feet of gas. 40 The average estimate
of the energy resource potential of the United States outer conti-
nental shelf lands is 28 billion barrels of oil and 167 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.4 1
While United States offshore oil and gas production in 1982 ac-
counted for approximately 10% of its domestic oil and about 25%
of its domestic natural gas,42 it has been estimated that the
United States OCS can be the "largest domestic source of oil and
gas between now and the 1990's." 43 According to the United
States Geological Survey up to 60% of the nation's undiscovered
oil and gas resources may be contained on the OCS.44
III. THE ACCELERATION OF OCS LEASING
Former Secretary Watt maintained that accelerating offshore
leasing in frontier OCS areas, such as Alaska, is in the national
interest.45 He claimed that the program "will enhance . . . na-
40. 1982 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 27, at 33.
41. Id. The total estimated undiscovered amount of recoverable onshore
crude oil is 54.6 billion barrels, with 6.9 billion being in Alaska. The total offshore
estimate is 28.0 billion barrels with 12.2 billion estimated to be in Alaska. As for
natural gas, the total estimated undiscovered recoverable amount onshore is 426.8
trillion cubic feet with 36.6 tr illion cubic feet in Alaska. The total offshore estimate
is 167.0 trillion cubic feet of gas with 64.6 trillion cubic feet estimated to be in
Alaska. Id. See also U.S.G.S. Boosts Estimate of Undiscovered Gas, Oil & Gas J.,
Mar. 9, 1981, at 48.
For a discussion on evaluating the energy production potential of the United
States OCS, see Prato & Miller, Evaluating the Energy Production Potential of the
United States Outer Continental Shelf 57 LAND ECON. 77 (1981); F. BECK & K.
WUG, THE ECONOAICS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SUPPLIES (1977).
42. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of Interior, The Facts: U.S.
Deparnent of Interior's Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program 7 (July 1983).
43. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1481.
44. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 215-16 (statement of Con-
gressman Edwin Forsythe).
45. News Release (Apr. 16, 1981), supra note 34. Secretary Watt explained the
need to expedite leasing in high potential offshore areas in the following manner-
Much of America's untapped petroleum resource may lie offshore in
frontier areas which have never been explored. To help reduce our depen-
dence on costly and uncertain foreign oil, we must inventory the lands
subject to Federal control in order to determine the value of the resources
which may be hidden within them. To do so we must facilitate explora-
tional security, provide jobs, and protect the environment while
making America less dependent on foreign oil sources."46 Like-
wise, he feels the new OCS lease schedule will improve the effi-
ciency of the OCS leasing program, and increase the availability
of the offshore energy resources so critical to the United States.
The Secretary outlined the major objectives of the revised OCS
program as including: (1) a substantial increase in the rate of
OCS leasing; (2) early lease sales of frontier areas with high oil
and gas potential; (3) larger lease offerings of entire planning ar-
eas; and (4) streamlining the OCS program to shorten the presale
planning process, and thus reduce the time required to start ex-
ploratory drilling in the OCS regions. 47 The main thrust of the
program is to accelerate the rate of OCS lease sales.4 8
Although the Reagan administration's decision to speed up off-
shore leasing is not the first time the OCS program has been ac-
celerated as part of a national energy program, 49 the OCS leasing
tion and development in those areas with potential resource value. The
proposal which is being announced today is designed to achieve these
goals while preserving sound environmental safeguards.
The program we are proposing will make more acreage available for
leasing, will cut substantially the time now required to start leasing in
promising frontier areas, and will use the market mechanism rather than
arbitrary government decisions in selecting areas for lease and explora-
tion.
By improving leasing procedures and eliminating administrative bottle-
necks, we can speed leasing while at the same time maintaining careful
protection of environmental values.
Id.
46. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 3.
47. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of Interior
Secretary James G. Watt). In a statement by Secretary Watt before a House Sub-
committee, he explained that the revised OCS program would consist of the
following:
First, there will be greater emphasis on early entry into areas of high
potential. Here we are talking about the frontier areas of offshore Alaska.
We are proposing earlier offerings of four of the five high potential basins
involved.
Second, we propose early reentry into high potential areas. Spacing
between first and second offerings is being decreased from 3 years to 2
years.
Third, we are streamlining the OCS leasing program. This includes pro-
posals for a general reduction in the time needed to hold a lease sale,
area-wide environmental and hydrocarbon resource assessments, tiering
of NEPA documents, larger lease offerings, and more efficient methods for
assuring receipt of fair market value.
The key is streamlining the program, including earlier opening of areas
with high potential.
Id.
48. Office of the Secretary, United States Dep't of the Interior, News Release
(July 15, 1981) [hereinafter cited as News Release (July 15, 1981) ].
49. In response to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-1974, President Nixon an-
nounced "Project Independence", a plan by which the United States would seek to
become energy self-sufficient by 1980. In April 1973, the President directed the
Secretary of Interior to triple, from one million to three million acres a year, OCS
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program approved by former Secretary Watt is a dramatic depar-
ture from past lease schedules. While the number of OCS lease
sales will not increase significantly, going from thirty-six to forty-
one in five years, the number of acres offered for leasing will. For
example, the average sale made by Secretary Andrus was 900,000
acres; under Secretary Watt's plan it will be twenty-four million
acres.5 0 Under the accelerated leasing schedule, the Interior De-
partment will offer almost the entire federal OCS, about one bil-
lion acres, for oil and gas leasing during 1982-87.51 In contrast,
from 1954-80, only forty-one million acres of federal offshore lands
were offered for lease and less than half, about nineteen million
acres, have been leased. 52 The most OCS acreage ever leased in
one year was 2.2 million acres in 1981.53
Not only has the acreage for each sale increased, but the total
annual acreage offered has also increased. Past annual offerings
ranged from 1.8 million acres in 1977 to 7.7 million acres in 1981.
However, 1983 total offerings could exceed 350 million acres.5 4
The average annual OCS acreage offered and leased has been
modest. From 1971 through 1980, about 2.9 million acres of OCS
lands were offered for lease and approximately 1.2 million acres
acreage under lease. In January 1974, President Nixon instructed him to further
accelerate the pace from three million to ten million acres, another tripling of the
OCS leasing goal in less than one year. See Comment, Onshore Impacts of Off-,,
shore Drilling: The Police Power Alternative, 8 Sw. L.J. 967 (1967); H.R. REP. No.
590, supra note 35, at 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1506-
07. Some commentators, however, argue that energy independence is an unattain-
able national goal. See Chapman, Energy: The Myth of Independence, Atlantic,
Jan., 1981, at 11.
50. SIERRA CLUB, THE GREAT GIVEAWAY: PUBLIC OIL, GAS, AND COAL AND THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as THE GREAT GIVEAWAY].
51. News Release (July 15, 1981), supra note 48. "One or more times during
the five-year period, all of the tracts in each of the 18 OCS planning areas ... will
be offered for lease, excepting tracts eliminated for environmental reasons and to
accommodate other uses." Id.
52. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 6, at 22. See also CONSER-
VATION DIVISION, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF STATISTICS 1953-1980, 10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
OCS STATISTICS]. From 19154 through the end of fiscal year 1981, fifty million acres
of federal offshore lands were offered for leasing of which 22 million acres have
been leased. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, FACT SHEET: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF FIVE-YEAR LEASING PROGRAM (Sept.
2, 1982) [hereinafter cited as FIVE-YEAR LEASING PROGRAM].
53. Watt Puts One Billion Acres of U.S. Coast Up for Bids Deseret News, July
22, 1982, at A2.
54. THE GREAT GIVEAWAY, supra note 50, at 6.
were leased.55 From these relatively small areas more than five
billion barrels of oil and forty-four trillion cubic feet of gas have
been found and produced through December 1979.56 "From these
volumes of production, it is clear that prospects for the discovery
of significant amounts of oil and gas in the unexplored portions of
the OCS have to be viewed as outstanding."5 7
Despite this optimistic appraisal of the energy resource poten-
tial of the OCS lands, in 1980 only 1% of all outer continental shelf
acreage was under lease, only 2% had ever been leased, and less
than 4% had ever been offered for lease.5 8 Through 1982, only 10%
of the acreage leased had been in frontier OCS regions outside
the producing areas of the Gulf of Mexico and the Santa Barbara
55. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 6, at 30.
Table Three














Average per year (2,858) (1,9)
Id.
56. Id. at 3, 23.
When state submerged lands are included in total United States offshore pro-
duction statistics, the total increases significantly. Through 1980, United States off-
shore lands (state and federal OCS) have produced over nine billion barrels of oil
and nearly 62 trillion cubic feet of gas. OCS STATISTICS, supra note 52, at 90-91.
57. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 2, supra note 1, at 370 (statement of Arthur
Spaulding, Vice-President and General Manager, Western Oil and Gas Association
and the Alaska Oil and Gas Association).
The petroleum industry views the offshore as the prime area for large oil discov-
eries, particularly the United States offshore. In 1981, Shell Oil Company spent
58% of its total $1.4 billion exploration budget in the United States offshore. Ball,
Mid-Year Report, Energy Forecast: Offshore Fares Well in Energy Storm, Off-
shore, May, 1982, at 125. See also Moore III, Offshore Drilling Maintains Fast Pace,
Oil & Gas J., May 3, 1982, at 45.
58. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2. supra note 1, at 15 (statement of W. Ken-
neth Davis, Deputy Secretary, United States Dep't of Energy).
Of nearly one billion acres of federal OCS lands only 12 million acres were
under lease as of fiscal year 1981. Table Four provides a break-down of acreage
under lease through fiscal year 1981.
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Channel.5 9 At this rate of offshore leasing, it was estimated that it
would take 1,736 years to inventory and lease the oil and gas re-
sources on the United States OCS.60 The Reagan administration
has determined that the nation does not have that much time to
spare.6 1
By comparison, the continental shelves controlled by the rest of
Table Four
Total Federal OCS Acres Under Lease and Active Leases
Through 1981
Total Acres Active
OCS Region Under Lease Leases
Atlantic 1,491,604 262
Gulf of Mexico 9,062,030 1,969
Offshore California 800,353 151
Offshore Alaska 638,627 129
TOTAL 12,037,614 2,511
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS
LEASING AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1981 1 (Apr.
1982) [hereinafter cited as OCS ANNUAL REPORT].
59. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fact Sheet: Outer
Continental Shelf Five- Year Leasing Program (Sept. 2, 1982).
60. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 370 (statement of Arthur
Spaulding, Vice-President and General Manager, Western Oil and Gas Associa-
tion). See also Hedberg, An Emergency Offshore Petroleum Program for the United
States, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 15, 1981, at 159. Even under former Secretary Watt's in-
creased rate of leasing, it will still take 137 years to evaluate the energy potential
of the federal OCS. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 370.
61. The total time required after a lease sale to achieve initial production is in
the range of four to eleven years, and to obtain peak production requires seven to
fourteen years. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 61, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1468. Therefore, the Reagan administration and Secretary
Watt would like to inventory the wealth of the nation as soon as possible.
The people of a land cannot understand their resource wealth until the
resources have been inventoried and their value and extent is known.
With all of America's greatness, we still do not understand our own
wealth. We must inventory our lands. Today, we do not know the full
extent of our mineral values, our agricultural potential, or our oil and gas
reserves. Unfortunately, the only way at this time to inventory our lands
to determine the qualities of oil and gas is to drill. Once we have invento-
ried the lands, we can then make wise decisions with regard to the alloca-
tion of wealth that is resident in the land.
Offshore Leasing Hearings supra note 12, at 513-14 (statement of Interior Secre-
tary James Watt). The petroleum industry supported Secretary Watt's efforts to
inventory United States offshore hydrocarbon resources. Accelerated OCS Leas-
ing a Key to Vital Assessnent of U.S. Resources, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 45.
And Congress has declared that "there is a serious lack of adequate basic energy
information . . . with respect to the availability of oil and natural gas from the
Outer Continental Shelf...." 43 U.S.C. § 1865(a) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
the world are more than 40% leased. 62 As a result, in 1981 off-
shore production accounted for 24% of total world oil produc-
tion. 63 In 1970, United States offshore production was 21.7% of
total world offshore production, but by 1980 it had fallen to 7.6%.64
62. Energy: Unlocking the Federal Lands, 13 Gov'T EXECUTIVE 16 (Mar. 1981);
H.R. REP. No. 1214, supra note 25, at 113. "By contrast, the United Kingdom has
offered [the] most and has leased about 40 percent, 52 million acres of the acreage
it controls in the North Sea." OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 15
(statement of W. Kenneth Davis, Deputy Secretary, United States Dep't of En-
ergy).
.Canada has been more aggressive in leasing offshore lands for oil and gas explo-
ration than has the United States. Canada has 262 million acres of offshore lands
under lease or permit whereas the United States has about 10 million acres of
OCS under lease or permit. Canada has also been more successful in exploring its
arctic waters than has the United States. Almost 300 wells have been drilled in
this region, revealing potential reserves in the Canadian arctic of somewhere be-
tween 570 million to 3.8 billion barrels of oil and 13 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
In contrast, the United States has drilled very few wells in its arctic waters and
those that have been drilled are just test wells. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3:
Hearings on Provisions of the Proposed Five- Year Leasing Program and its Im-
pact on Offshore Operations and Examine the GOA Report on the Five-Year Pro-
gram Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1982)
(statement of J. Robinson West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget, and Ad-
ministration, United States Dep't of the Interior) [hereinafter cited as OCS Over-
sight Hearings-Part 3]. Canada has also leased more acreage in Atlantic waters
than has the United States. Less than 1.4 million acres have been leased in the
United States Atlantic waters. This compares to 123 million acres of the Canadian
Atlantic waters covered by leases or permits. FIVE-YEAR LEASING PROGRAM, supra
note 52.
In 1979 the People's Republic of China authorized foreign petroleum companies
to explore 176,000 square miles of China's offshore. Thus, as someone in the oil
industry noted, "in one year the Chinese now know more about an area 6.5 times
larger than the total area awarded by the U.S. in 26 years." Brazil has also an-
nounced plans to offer vast areas of its offshore lands for oil and gas exploration.
Wassall, Government Indifferent to Need for Offshore Oil Exploration, Oil & Gas J.,
May 5, 1980, at 221, 222. See also Yuan, China's Offshore Development: Legal and
Geopolitical Perspectives, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 107 (1983); Brazil Leads Exploration
Off S. America, Offshore, June 20, 1982, at 151; and PRC Ready to Move Skills, Off-
shore, June 20, 1980, at 181.
63. World Offshore Well Count Shows Strength, Offshore, June 20, 1982, at 47;
Figures Reflect Offshore Growth, Offshore, June 20, 1982, at 61. The leading produ-
cers of offshore oil in 1982 were Saudi Arabia (3 million barrels per day), the
United Kingdom (1.8 million barrels per day), Mexico (1.11 million barrels per
day), the United States (1.06 million barrels per day), and Venezuela (1.04 million
barrels per day). Figures Reflect Offshore Growth, supra, at 61-62. These five
countries are the major producers of offshore oil. Together, in 1981, they ac-
counted for 59% of the world's offshore petroleum production. World Offshore Well
Count Shows Strength, supra, at 47.
64. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3, supra note 62 (statement of J. Robinson
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget, and Administration, United States
Dep't of the Interior). See also News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 3, at 2.
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IV. THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON
THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
Development of OCS oil and gas resources is conducted pursu-
ant to presidential proclamation, international agreement, and
congressional legislation. Among the more important items are:65
(1) the Truman Proclamation of 1945;66 (2) the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention of the Continental Shelf;67 (3) the Submerged Lands Act
of 1953;68 (4) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953;69 (5)
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978;70 (6)
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969;71 (7) the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972;72 (8) the Endangered Species Act
of 1973;73 (9) the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972;74 and
(10) the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972.75 The balance of this article will be a brief description of the
content and historical impact of each of these important items on
OCS development with an emphasis on how they may influence
the judicial resolution of the OCS controversy in the future.
A. The Truman Proclamation of 1945
As early as 1894, oil had been extracted from wells off the coast
of southern California. Offshore drilling, however, was confined'to
shallow, near-shore waters because technology was unsophistica-
ted.76 There was little economic interest in offshore exploration
until post-World War II technology facilitated penetration to
greater depths and revealed the wealth located on continental
65. Hildreth, The Coast: Where Energy Meets the Environment, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 253, 266 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 57-58, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1464, 1465.
66. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
67. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
68. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1976).
69. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
70. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1465-1465a (1982); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (Supp. V
1981).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
72. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-146% (1982).
73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543.
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1982).
76. L. JUDA, OCEAN SPACE RIGHTS: DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY 12 (1976) [herein-
after cited as L. JUDA]. See also Krueger, The Development and Administration of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands of the United States, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 643, 675 (1968).
shelves. 77
To advance development of continental shelf petroleum re-
sources, President Truman, on September 28, 1945, issued a proc-
lamation which unilaterally declared that "the Government of the
United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea
bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous
to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and control." 78 On the same day,
President Truman issued an executive order which "set aside the
resources of the continental shelf under the high seas and placed
them, for administrative purposes, pending legislative action,
under the jurisdiction and control of the Secretary of the
Interior."79
As stated in the Proclamation, the reasons justifying the exclu-
sive claim by a coastal state to the resources of its continental
shelf were: (1) a world-wide need for new sources of petroleum
and other minerals; (2) the existence of these resources under
the continental shelf and the technological feasibility of their ex-
ploitation; and (3) the necessity of an established governance
over these resources to further their conservation and prudent
utilization.80
The fourth justification, from which the legal theory of the Proc-
lamation is to be extracted, is that "the exercise of jurisdiction
over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the conti-
nental shelf by a contiguous nation is reasonable and just."l8
This assertion is supported with the following arguments:
(1) The effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources
would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore.
(2) The continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-
mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it.
(3) These resources (under the continental shelf) frequently form a sea-
ward extension of a pool or deposit lying within [United States] territory.
(4) Self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over
activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for utilization of
these resources.
8 2
The Truman Proclamation was not intended as a declaration of
77. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1481; Dean, Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 41 TUL. L.
REV. 419 (1967); Gutteridge, The Regime of the Continental Shelf, 44 GROTIUS Soc'Y
77, 83 (1958).
78. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945). The Truman Proclama-
tion is reprinted at 13 Dep't of State Bull. 485 (1945); 1 NEW DmECTIONS IN THE LAW
OF THE SEA 106 (1973); L. JUDA, supra note 76, at 151.
79. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
80. Id. See also Franklin, supra note 37, at 38-44; Waldock, The Legal Basis on
Claims to the Continental Shelf, 36 GROTIUS Soc'Y 115, 123-27 (1950).
81. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
82. Id.
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absolute sovereignty over the continental shelf.83 It stressed that
"the character as high seas of the waters above the continental
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation" were
in no way to be affected by the United States claim.8 4 However,
the words "jurisdiction and control" over the "natural resources"
of the continental shelf, appeared to be the equivalent of a claim
of sovereignty. 85 One commentator wrote:
One cannot read [the TrumanI Proclamation without feeling that within
the area of its Continental Shelf, the United States is claiming rights
which are as large as sovereignty. . . . [I]f the rights claimed over the
Continental Shelf and its resources were called sovereignty, they would
be not more extensive than what are claimed in the Proclamation.
8 6
The Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf was a
landmark declaration.8 7 "It laid claim to a greater submarine area
than any other claim in history .... -88 "Prior to 1945 it is clear
that there was no internationally recognized appropriation or
right of appropriation to submarine areas outside of a nation's ter-
ritorial sea."89 The Truman Proclamation marks a period of tran-
83. Young, Recent Deveiopments with Respect to the Continental Shelf, 42 AM.
J. INT'L L. 849, 850 (1948).
84. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
85. The Interior Department wanted a declaration of absolute sovereignty over
the continental shelf and the waters above it. The Department of State, however,
strongly opposed a United States claim to sovereignty over continental shelf lands.
The federal government's assertion of "jurisdiction and control" over the re-
sources of the continental shelf was finally agreed upon. State Department oppo-
sition to a United States claim to sovereignty over the entire continental shelf and
the waters above it was based on the following four points:
First, it would be difficult to obtain acceptance from other states of a
claim to territorial waters far exceeding the generally observed three-mile
limit. Second, such a claim by the United States would encourage other
states to make similar claims of their own, thus leading to interference
with normal American fishing operations in places such as Mexico and
Cuba (shrimp) and the west coast Latin American states (tuna). Third,
wider territorial seas would make it more difficult for the United States
Navy since unfriendly ships could take refuge in neutral territorial waters
of correspondingly wide extent. Fourth, there was really no need to claim
sovereignty when all that was called for was control over the resources of
the seabed of the continental shelf.
L. JUDA, supra note 76, at 16.
86. Hurst, The Continental Shelf, 34 GROTUS Soc'Y 153, 162 (1949). See also
Waldock, supra note 80, at '128.
87. For a thorough discussion on the shaping of the Truman Proclamation on
the Continental Shelf, see A. Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclama-
tions, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1976); Bingham, Juridical Status of the Continental
Shelf, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 4 (1952); L. JUDA, supra note 76, at 11-24.
88. Franklin, supra note 37, at 38.
89. Krueger, Mineral Development on the Continental Shelf and Beyond, 42
CAL. ST. B.J. 515 (1967). One commentator has written that "the Truman Procla-
sition in the relations between the United States and the global
oceans. From a regional power primarily preoccupied with do-
mestic concerns, the United States emerged during the Second
World War with a vital interest in global maritime issues. The
Proclamation incorporates both the domestic and global perspec-
tives of the United States in the post-World War II era.90
The Truman Proclamation provided a precedent for claims by
other coastal countries to their continental shelves. 91 The Procla-
mation had an expansionistic approach and was adopted unilater-
ally rather than through multilateral negotiations with other
states. 92 The claims by other countries, as might be suspected,
were not uniform. Some states claimed their adjacent continental
shelves to indefinite lengths and depths while other states re-
stricted their claims by either length or depth.93 Despite the lack
of uniformity, the frequency with which they were made and their
acceptance by other countries led some commentators to con-
clude that by the early 1950's "the appropriation--or which is es-
sentially the same, the right of appropriation--of the adjacent
submarine areas have become part of international law by custom
initiated by the leading maritime powers and acquiesced in by
the generality of states." 94 If such a regime in fact existed, it re-
mained vague and indefinite. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the
mation was entirely without precedent." Holland, The Juridical Status of the Con-
tinental Shelf 30 TEX. L. REV. 586, 590 (1952).
90. A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 18 (1981).
91. Carter, The Seabed Beyond the Limits-of National Jurisdiction, 4 STAN. J.
INT'L STUD. 1 (1969); Holland, supra note 90, at 591-94.
92. L. JUDA, supra note 76, at 24.
93. Krueger, The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Need for Its Re-
vision and Some Comments Regarding the Regime for the Lands Beyond, 1 NAT.
RESOURCES J. .1, 2 (1968); Comment, The Lagging Law of the Continental Shelf:
Some Problems and Proposals, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 131, 138 (1972); C. Franklin,
supra note 37, at 49-62. The most far-reaching claims to ownership of adjacent
continental shelves were made by South and Central American countries. In 1946,
Argentina and Panama issued proclamations that claimed sovereignty over their
continental shelves., And in 1947, Chile, a nation with practically no continental
shelf, claimed sovereignty over "the whole continental shelf of whatever depth" to
a distance of 200 miles from shore. Shortly thereafter, Ecuador and Peru followed
Chile's claim and asserted jurisdiction over the natural resources of adjacent seas
to a distance of 200 miles from their coasts. Morris, The Continental Shelf-An In-
ternational Dilemma, 1 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 37, 39 (1958); Campbell, International
Law Developments Concerning National Claims to and in Offshore Areas, 33 TUL.
L. REV. 339, 343-44 (1959); Young, supra note 83, at 851-55; L. JUDA, supra note 76, at
24-27.
94. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 376,
431 (1950). See also Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine of the Continental
Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 442, 472
(1970).
For discussion on the claims of various nations to the natural resources of adja-
cent seabeds that foreshadowed the Truman Proclamation, see Hurst, Whose is the
Bed of the Sea?, 4 BarT. U.B. INT'L L. 34 (1923-1924); Cosford, The Continental Shelf
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Law of the Sea, which culminated in the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf, brought some clarity to the emerging
doctrine of the continental shelf.
B. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was the
first attempt by the international community to define the legal
concept of the continental shelf.95 The convention defined the
continental shelf as:
(a) . .. the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of
the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the sea-
bed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.9 6
1910-1945, 4 McGIL L.J. 245 (1958); Freeman, Law of the Continental Shelf and
Ocean Resources-An Overview, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 105, 105-11 (1979).
95. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 67.
The 1958 Geneva Convention of the United Nations codified the prevailing law of
the sea and, in addition to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, included the
Convention on the High Seas, April 1, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 16 U.N.T.S. 205; and the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
The Convention partitioned the oceans into five jurisdictional zones. Starting
landward, these zones are: (1) internal waters; (2) territorial sea; (3) contiguous
zone; (4) continental shelf; and (5) high seas. The coastal state exercises com-
plete sovereignty over its internal waters, but has no jurisdictional claim to the
outermost zone, the high seas, which is open to all nations. Alexander, National
Jurisdiction and the Use of the Sea, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 375-76 (1968).
While the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was the first at-
tempt by the international community to define the legal regime of the continental
shelf, the first significant development in continental shelf law was the treaty en-
tered into between Great Britain and Venezuela on February 26, 1942. This treaty
settled a controversy between Venezuela and Trinidad over the ownership of the
submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, located between Venezuela and the Island of
Trinidad. The treaty authorized petroleum exploitation on the Gulf of Paria conti-
nental shelf by dividing the disputed area in half. This treaty foreshadowed the
Truman Proclamation of 1945 in that it contained no express claim to "sover-
eignty" over the submarine areas of the gulf but used language which was
equivalent to an assertion of sovereignty. Similarly, the treaty foreshadowed the
Truman Proclamation in that it recognized exploitation of the submarine areas of
the gulf would not affect the status of the waters of the Gulf of Paria or any rights
of navigation through the superjacent high seas. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE
PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 636 (1962); Note, The Continental Shelf and the
United States, 22 S.C.L. REV. 34, 35 (1970); Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: A STUDY IN THE DYNAMICS OF CUSTOMARY RULES OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 71-74 (1968).
96. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 67, art. 1.
Under this dual standard, the coastal nation has a minimum
area of jurisdiction out to 200 meters depth and a maximum that
is fixed only by technological ability to exploit the resources of
the continental shelf.97 Pursuant to the depth-of-exploitability
definition, the maximum width of the continental shelf capable of
exploitation will continue to increase as the world's technology
for exploiting the seabed improves.98
By adding the alternative definition of exploitability beyond the
200 meter depth of superjacent waters, the Geneva Convention
recognized several significant facts. First, the continental shelf in
certain parts of the world includes areas of depths greater than
200 meters. Thus, by using the alternative depth-of-exploitability
definition, a coastal state is not deprived of a part of its continen-
tal shelf. Furthermore, the coastal state is best able to exploit the
resources of adjacent continental shelves. Second, the convention
would otherwise have been outdated as soon as it became feasi-
ble to exploit resources at depths greater than 200 meters. The
exploitability definition, however, provides flexibility to permit
coastal states to extend sovereign rights over adjacent continental
shelves as advancing offshore technology permits the exploitation
of submarine resources beyond the 200 meter edge. The third fact
is the vast inequity in the distribution of continental shelves
throughout the world. The exploitability test places coastal states
in a more equal position concerning the exercise of national juris-
diction over adjacent continental shelves.99
The "doctrine of the continental shelf' is essentially the claim
that a coastal state has the exclusive rights to exploit the natural
resources on and under its adjacent continental shelf. The con-
vention recognized that "the coastal State exercises over the con-
tinental shelf sovereign (and exclusive) rights for the purpose of
97. Dean, supra note 77, at 423. For discussion on the outer limit of the conti-
nental shelf, see Goldie, Where is the Continental Shelfs Outer Boundary?, 1 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 461 (1970); Brown, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 1968
Juridical Review 111; Finlay, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 64 Am. J.
INT'L L. 42 (1970).
98. C. Franklin, supra note 37, at 25.
99. Id. at 29-30; Brock, Mineral Resources and the Future Development of the
International Law of the Sea, 22 JAG 39, 40 (1967). The continental shelf off the
coast of South America is extremely narrow. In most of these countries the 200
meter edge is within ten to fifteen miles of the coast, whereas it extends over 200
miles out to sea off the Gulf of Alaska. For discussion critical of the Geneva Con-
vention definition of the continental shelf, particularly the exploitability test, see
Ely, American Policy Options in the Development of Undersea Mineral Resources,
2 INT'L LAw. 215, 218-20 (1967); Oda, The Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Some Suggestions for their Revision, 1 NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 103 (1968); Oda, Pro-
posals for Revising the Convention on the Continental Shelf 7 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1 (1968).
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exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."100 The natural
resources of the continental shelf over which a coastal nation has
sovereign rights were defined to "consist of the mineral and other
nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living
organisms belonging to sedentary species."' 0 '
The legal concept of the continental shelf was initiated in the
1945 Truman Proclamation, and formally codified by the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf.102 The continental shelf
doctrine is a recognition that petroleum is a valuable resource,
that great quantities of petroleum exist on the continental shelf,
and that technology has made possible the development of off-
shore oil.103
Historically, nations of the world have asserted jurisdiction over
a narrow belt of adjacent coastal waters ranging from three to
twelve miles from shore. Today, however, most coastal states
claim sovereignty over an exclusive economic zone extending 200
miles from their coasts where they exercise exclusive rights to ex-
ploit submarine resources. 0 4 The exclusive economic zone con-
cept was endorsed by the United States on March 10, 1983, when
President Reagan issued a proclamation that confirmed the rights
of all states within an Exclusive Economic Zone.105 This move-
100. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 67, art. 2(1), (2).
101. Id. at art. 2(4). For discussion on article 2(4) of the Convention, see Gol-
die, Sedentary Fisheries and Article 2(4) of the Convention of the Continental
Shelf-A Plea for a Separate Regime, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 86 (1969).
102. Lehman, The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf, 20 LA. L. REV. 646, 647
(1969).
103. Kunz, Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse, 50
AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 829 (1956):, Hurst, supra note 86, at 158.
For a detailing of the technological reasons behind the Truman Proclamation,
see the White House press release reprinted in L. JUDA, supra note 76, at 156-57.
104. For discussion on unilateral claims to expanded offshore jurisdiction, see
generally Alexander & Hodgs on, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the
Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 569 (1975); Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile
Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977); Kruger & Nordquist, The Evolution of
the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA.
J. INT'L L. 321 (1979).
105. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983). The Exclusive
Economic Zone of the United States is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea
zone extending 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea. Within
this zone, the United States 'has, to the extent permitted by international law:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving
and managing natural resources, both living and non-living, of the seabed
and subsoil in the superjacent waters and with regard to other activities
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro-
duction of energy from the water, currents and winds; and (b) jurisdiction
ment toward partition of the world's oceans into national lakes
presents a serious challenge to the traditional concept of freedom
of the seas articulated by Hugo Grotius in 1609, and observed by
the international community for nearly 300 years.l0 6
C. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953
Beginning in 1921, California and several other coastal states
began granting oil and gas leases to offshore lands lying adjacent
to their coasts.107 The claim of state ownership to these sub-
merged lands was based in part on an 1845 decision by the United
States Supreme Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan'0 8 which held
that the states owned lands underlying navigable waters within
their jurisdictions. That decision stated in dictum that if state
boundaries extended out from the coastline, state ownership of
submerged lands extended into the sea as well.109
The federal government initially recognized coastal states' title
to the lands and resources beneath the marginal belt" 0 extending
out three miles from the shore."' This federal policy was re-
versed in 1945, when the federal government claimed jurisdiction
with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, and installa-
tions and structures having economic purposes, and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment.
Although the Proclamation was a unilateral declaration, the United States pledged
to exercise these sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with international
law. The Proclamation does not change existing United States policies concerning
the continental shelf, marine mammals, or fisheries. Furthermore, the United
States claim does not affect the high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight, the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of
the sea. Id.
106. For discussion on the contribution of Hugo Grotius to the development of
international law, see Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1946); Christy, Jr., Marine Resources and the Freedom of the
Seas, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 424 (1968).
107. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, App. I (1948), reprinted in 1953
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1415, 1426-27. See also United States v. California,
322 U.S. 19, 23, 38 (1947).
108. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
109. Id. at 230. See also Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264 (1891)
("the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of Massachussetts over the sea adjacent
to its coast is that of an independent nation; and, except so far as any right of con-
trol over this territory has been granted to the United States, this control remains
with the State").
110. The marine belt is defined as: "That portion of the main or open sea, adja-
cent to the shores of a given country, over which the jurisdiction of its municipal
laws and local authorities extends. Territorial waters, is defined by international
law as extending out three miles from the shore." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 872
(5th ed. 1979).
111. Note, The Federal-State Offshore Oil Dispute, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 755
(1970); H.R. REP. No. 1778, supra note 107, at 24, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG.,
& AD. NEWS, at 1417.
As late as 1933, then Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, refused to grant a
federal oil lease on lands under the Pacific Ocean adjacent to the California coast
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over the offshore areas which had been leased by the states for oil
and gas exploration. 1 2 The federal government filed suit against
the state of California and asserted federal ownership of sub-
merged lands." 3
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953114 (SLA) was the result of
the Supreme Court's historic decisions in United States v. Califor-
nia,15 United States v. Louisiana,16 and United States v.
Texas.1 7 In these cases, commonly known as the Submerged
Lands Cases," 8 the Supreme Court held that the federal govern-
because "title to the soil under the ocean within the three-mile limit is in the State
of California, and the land may not be appropriated except by the State." Id.
Congress' failure to enact legislation claimng federal ownership over submeged
lands and its enactment of House Joint Resolution 225 confirming coastal state
ownership to such lands (which was vetoed by President Truman) established
that Congressional policy has consistently recognized state ownership of the
three-mile marginal belt adjacent to shore. Id. at 34, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1427.
Prior to 1937, the policy of the executive departments of the federal government
was consistently to recognize state ownership of the submerged lands as evi-
denced by approximately thirty opinions issued by the Department of the Interior,
and the War Department's request ,that the states grant these lands to the United
States for military use. Id. at 34.
From 1842 to 1935 the Supreme Court, in more than thirty cases, expressed in
dictum that the states owned the lands and resources beneath the tidewaters. Id.
at 34-35, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 1428-29.
112. Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 93.
113. Note, The Federal--State Offshore Oil Dispute, supra note 111, at 756.
The question of who owned the bed of the marginal sea initially attained na-
tional significance in the 1930's when it became commercially practicable to pro-
mote the exploration and development of petroleum deposits known to be located
in offshore lands. However, the federal/state conflict over ownership of sub-
merged lands was raised for the first time in the 1920's and 1930's when coastal
states began granting permits authorizing the exploitation of offshore resources.
United States v. California 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947); Henri, The Atlantic States'
Claim to Offshore Oil Rights: United States v. Maine, 21 ENv'rT AFF. 827, 828
(1973).
114. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1976).
115. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
116. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
117. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
118. Shalowitz, Boundary Problems Rased by the Submerged Lands Act, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1954).
For a discussion on the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and cases decided under
it, see generally Connally, Governmental Regulation of Operations on Submerged
Lands, 21 On. & GAS INST. 31 (1970); Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States,
64 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1966); Shavelson, The Admtntstration of Offshore Mineral
Leasing Statutes in the Pactfic Southwest (California, Oregon, and Hawaii), 1
NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 60 (1968); Lewis, A Capsule History and the Present Status
of the Tidelands Controversy, 3 NAT. REsOuRcEs LAW. 620 (1970); BARTLEY, THE
TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY: A LEGAL AND HISTORIcAL ANALYsIS (1953).
ment, rather than the states, had paramount rights in, and full do-
minion and power over, the submerged lands, including the right
to extract oil and other resources.119 The Court reasoned that
protection and control of the area is a function of "national exter-
nal sovereignty"120 and explained: '"The marginal sea (three-mile
belt off the coast) is a national, not a state concern. National in-
terest, national responsibilities, national concerns are involved.
The problems of commerce, national defense, relations with other
powers, war and peace focus there. National rights must there-
fore be paramount in that area."1 21
In United States v. California, the Court established federal
ownership over submerged lands.122 The litigation began in 1945
when the United States brought an original action in the Supreme
Court against the state of California. The federal government al-
leged that the state, without authority, was granting leases for the
extraction of oil in the three-mile marginal belt along the Califor-
nia coast, an area outside the inland waters of the state, and that
the United States had paramount rights in the submerged
lands.' 23
California claimed that pursuant to Pollard's Lessee v. Ha-
gan, 124 it owned the resources of the submerged lands under the
three-mile marginal belt as an incident of sovereignty which it ex-
ercised over that water area. The state noted that its original con-
stitution, adopted in 1849 prior to its admittance to the Union,
included within the state's boundary the water area extending
three English miles from the shore;125 that the Enabling Act,
which admitted California to the Union, ratified the territorial
boundary thus defined; and that California was admitted "on an
equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever.' 26
The federal government did not deny that under the Pollard
rule California owned lands under inland navigable waters such
119. 332 U.S. 19, 38-39. 'The paramount-rights doctrine [was) used in the sub-
merged lands cases to obtain for the United States what amounts to all the aspects
of ownership of an area, without the necessity for any formal congressional decla-
ration of annexation." BARTLEY, supra note 118, at 252. For discussion of the doc-
trine of federal paramount powers as articulated in the California case, see
BARTLEY, supra note 118, at 247-73.
120. 332 U.S. at 34; 339 U.S. 699, 704.
121. 339 U.S. at 704.
122. For other discussions of California, see generally Hanna, The Submerged
Land Cases, 3 STAN. L. REV. 193, 196-209 (1951); Comment, United States v. Califor-
nia, Paramount Rights of the Federal Government in Submerged Coastal Lands,
26 TEx. L. REV. 304 (1948).
123. 332 U.S. at 23.
124. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See supra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
125. CAL. CONST. art. XII.
126. 332 U.S. at 29-30.
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as rivers, harbors and tidelands down to the low water mark, but
argued that the Pollard rule should not be extended so as to ap-
ply to lands under the ocean.127 It stressed that the thirteen origi-
nal colonies did not own the marginal belt; that the federal
government did not assert its superior rights to this area until af-
ter the formation of the Union; and that it has not granted any of
these rights to the states, retaining them as subjects of national
sovereignty. Further, the government maintained that no previ-
ous Supreme Court case had decided conflicting claims of a state
and the federal government to the three-mile belt in a manner
which required the Court's extension of the Pollard inland water
rule to the submerged lands.12 8
The Court was not persuaded to apply the Pollard rule of own-
ership to the submerged landsl29 In holding for the United
States, 30 the Court declared that:
California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast,
and that the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount
rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion
over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil.
1 3 1
The federal government later brought and won similar suits
127. Id. at 30-31.
128. Id. at 31.
129. Id. at 36.
[W]e cannot say that the thirteen original colonies separately acquired
ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it, even if they did ac-
quire elements of the sovereignty of the English Crown by their revolu-
tion against it....
At the time this country won its independence from England there was
no settled international custom or understanding among nations that each
nation owned a three-mile water belt along its borders. . . . [Wihen this
nation was formed, the idea of a three-mile belt over which a littoral na-
tion could exercise rights of ownership was but a nebulous suggestion.
Neither the English charters granted to this nation's settlers, nor the
treaty of peace with England, nor any other document to which we have
been referred, showed a purpose to set apart a three-mile ocean belt for
colonial or state ownership.
Id. at 31-32.
130. Id. at 41.
131. Id. at 38-39. Past cases of possible interest include: Appleby v. City of
New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (rights to land under water must reside in those who
have ownership); Manchester v. Massachussetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (the minimum
limit of territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tidewaters is approximately three
miles from its coast); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (states hcild exclu-
sive control over fishing rights for their citizens, subject to free flow of navigation
in the waters, and such control is a property right rather than a mere privilege or
immunity of citizenship); Martin v. Waddell's Lessees, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)
(fishing rights were vested in the state for the benefit of all citizens).
against Louisiana,132 Texas,133 and Maine.134 Congress, however,
did not agree with the Supreme Court's holdings. 35 In 1952, Con-
gress sent Senate Joint Resolution Twenty to President Truman
quitclaiming all federal interests in the submerged lands to the
coastal states,136 and restoring to the coastal states the ownership
of the submerged lands in the three-mile limit.137 President Tru-
man, a firm proponent of federal ownership of offshore resources,
vetoed the Senate Joint Resolution because "it would turn over to
certain States, as a free gift, very valuable lands and mineral re-
132. United States v. Louisiana, 338 U.S. 699 (1950). The only significant differ-
ence between the California and Louisiana cases is that California claimed rights
in the three-mile belt while Louisiana claimed rights twenty-four miles seaward of
the three-mile belt. Id. at 705. For discussion on the Louisiana legislation ex-
tending the Louisiana seaward boundary see Loret, Louisiana's Twenty-Seven
Mile Maritime Belt, 13 TuL. L. REV. 253 (1959); Note, International Law-Power of
a State to Extend its Boundary Beyond the Three Mile Limit, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
317 (1939).
133. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
Texas maintained that prior to its annexation into the Union it was an independ-
ent republic and therefore possessed both dominium (ownership or proprietary
rights) and imperium (governmental powers of regulation and control) over the
lands, minerals, and other products underlying the marginal sea. Texas claimed
that when it entered the Union it retained the dominium over the marginal sea
which Texas had previously acquired as an independent nation and transferred to
the federal government only its powers of sovereignty-imperium-over the mar-
ginal sea. Id. at 712-13; BARTLEY, supra note 118, at 195-212.
As an independent republic, Texas must have enjoyed the same paramount
rights in its offshore submerged lands that the Court in the California case said
the United States possessed by virtue of its national external sovereignty. On the
other hand, if the doctrine of federal paramount rights was valid with respect to
the marginal sea off the coast of California, then it must apply with equal force to
every other coastal state in the Union. The Court resolved this seemingly irrecon-
cilable problem by a new interpretation of the equal footing doctrine, which it held
"prevents extension of the sovereignty of a State into a domain of political and
sovereign power of the United States from which the other States have been ex-
cluded." 339 U.S. at 719-20. The Supreme Court reasoned that if Texas' equal foot-
ing argument was adopted it "would produce inequality among the States." Id. at
720. The Court stated:
When Texas came into the Union, she ceased to be an independent na-
tion. She then became a sister State on an "equal footing" with all the
other States. That act concededly entailed a relinquishment of some of
her sovereignty .... [A]s an incident to the transfer of that sovereignty
any claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea was relinquished
to the United States.
Id. at 717-18.
134. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) (thirteen states bordering on
the Atlantic Ocean sought to exercise jurisdiction over lands located under the
tidewaters of their states to a distance extending to the outermost jurisdiction of
the United States. The Supreme Court held, however, that protection and control
of the area was instead a function of national external sovereignty, in accordance
with United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31-34 (1947)).
135. Wulf, Freezing the Boundary Dividing Federal and State Interests in Off-
shore Submerged Lands, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 584, 590 (1971); Illig, supra note 113,
at 53.
136. S.J. REs. 20, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
137. BARTLEY, supra note 118, at 214.
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sources [owned by] the United States as a whole."138 No attempt
was made to override the veto,139 and numerous similar bills in-
troduced in Congress which would have quitclaimed the lands
and resources underlying the three-mile marginal belt4o were
also consistently opposed as "giveaway" legislation.141
With General Eisenhower's election to the presidency, Tru-
man's efforts to preserve federal ownership of submerged lands
were quickly reversed.142 On May 22, 1953, President Eisenhower
signed the SLA into law.143 This Act granted the states ownership
to and proprietary use of all lands under their navigable waters
for a distance of three geographical miles from their coastlines, or
to the historic seaward boundaries as they existed at the time the
states became members of the Union.144 A state, therefore, could
claim ownership beyond three miles if it had a greater boundary
at the time the state became a member of the Union or if Con-
gress had approved a boundary in excess of three miles prior to
138. Tidelands Bill Veto, 98 CONG.. REC. 6251 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 908.
139. Wulf, supra note 135, at 590; S. REP. No. 133, supra note 114, at 23, reprinted
in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1499.
There were numerous congressional attempts before 1952 to quitclaim the sub-
merged lands to the states. The actions of Interior Secretary Ickes and the intro-
duction of the Nye Resolution alleging the existence of federal rights in the
submerged lands forced those who believed in state ownership of the three-mile
marginal belt to seek recognition of such ownership by Congress. BARTLEY, supra
note 118, at 144; S. REP. No. 133, supra note 114, at 21-22, reprinted in 1953 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1497-98. In 1953, Congress passed House Joint Resolu-
tion 225 which would have accomplished the same purpose as Senate Joint Reso-
lution 20 which President Truman had vetoed in 1952. The President vetoed
Resolution 225 and the House failed to override the veto. S. REP. No. 133, supra
note 114, at 22, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1498. President
Truman's veto message is printed at S. REP. No.133-Part 2, App. F(3), supra note
114, at 112-13, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1712-13.
140. For a listing of the various quitclaim bills and resolutions, see BARTLEY,
supra note 118, at 144 n.1 and 213 nn.1-2. For a discussion on congressional--exec-
utive contention, including proposed quitclaim legislation, during the Truman pe-
riod, see id. at 144-58, 213-46; A. HOLLICK, supra note 89, at 103-11; Metcalfe, The
Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Problem, 4
SYRACUSE L. REV. 39 (1952).
141. Tidelands Bill Veto, 98 CONG. REc. 6251 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 908, 910. For an extensive discussion of the views of federal
officials who maintained that quitclaim legislation was an "oil give-away" measure,
see S. REP. No. 133-Part 2, supra note 113, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1534-1640.
142. A. HouLcK, supra note 89, at 111-114.
143. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1976).
144. Id. at §§ 1311(a), 1312; H.R. REP. No, 590, supra note 35, at 57, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1464.
May 22, 1953.145 "But in no event shall the term 'boundaries' or
the term 'lands beneath navigable waters' be interpreted as ex-
tending from the coast line more than three geographical miles
into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three
marine leagues [about 10.5 miles] into the Gulf of Mexico."' 46
The constitutionality of the SLA was challenged by Alabama
and Rhode Island.147 These states denied that "Congress has any
power to dispose of the national interest in the ocean or its un-
captured resources."1 48 They argued "that whatever power the
United States has over the Ocean is an inseparable part of na-
tional sovereignty which cannot be irrevocably parcelled out or
delegated to states, individuals or private business groups."149 In
a per curiam decision, the Court held that the Submerged Lands
Act was constitutional, stating that the power the Constitution
provides Congress to dispose of property belonging to the United
States is without limitation. 50
The enactment of the SLA did not resolve federal-state conflict
over title to offshore lands and submerged petroleum resources.
In 1969, the United States invoked the original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court and filed a complaint against Maine
and the twelve other states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean151
seeking a declaration that these states had interfered with the
federal government's exclusive proprietary rights in continental
shelf lands and resources beyond the three-mile marginal sea.152
The litigation was prompted when Maine issued permits for oil
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976).
146. Id. at § 1301(b) (1976). The Submerged Lands Act also confirmed United
States jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of that portion of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf lying seaward and outside of the three-
mile limit of inland state waters. Id. at § 1302. Subsequent litigation provided
that, for historic reasons, the boundaries of Texas and Florida (along the Gulf of
Mexico side) would be three marine leagues, while the boundaries of three of the
other states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama) would be only three marine miles into the Gulf. Stone, Legal Aspects of
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 478, 480 n.16 (1968).
147. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1953).
148. Id. at 277 (Black, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1914)). The Constitution states: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
... Property belonging to the United States .... U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2.
151. In addition to Maine, the United States joined twelve other Atlantic coast
states in the litigation, including: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia, and Florida. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 516-17 (1975). Con-
necticut was not joined as a defendant because it borders on Long Island Sound,
which is considered inland water rather than open sea. Id. at 517 n.1.
152. Id. at 517. For a discussion of Maine, see Morris, The Forging of the Union
Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of State Sovereignty Over Seabeds, 74
[Vol. 11: 9, 19831 Shelf Energy Resources
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
and gas exploration in 3.3 million acres of submerged lands in the
Atlantic Ocean, well beyond the three-mile limit. 5 3
The Atlantic states opposed the federal government's assertion
of sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil off the Atlantic coast
beyond the three-mile marginal sea. They based their claim to
this area on English law, and specific colonial grants and charters
from the British Crown to the colonies. 5 4 The Supreme Court re-
jected the Atlantic states' claims to the seabed beyond the three-
mile marginal sea and held: as an incident of national external
sovereignty, the United States, to the exclusion of the Atlantic
coastal states, had sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil
underlying the Atlantic Ocean seaward of the three-mile marginal
sea to the outer edge of the continental shelf. 55 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases,
as well as the Submerged Lands Act, were squarely at odds with
the Atlantic states' claims to the seabed beyond the three-mile
marginal sea.156
COLUM. L. REV. 1056 (1974); Note, States' Rights in the Outer Continental Shelf De-
nied by the United States Supreme Court, 30 ME. L. REV. 203 (1975).
Disputes between federal and state governments over offshore petroleum policy
are not unique to the United States. Canada and Australia have experienced simi-
lar problems. For discussion on the mode of settlement of disputes between fed-
eral and state governments over offshore energy resource policy in the United
States, Canada, and Australia, see Taylor, The Settlement of Disputes Between Fed-
eral and State Governments Concerning Offshore Petroleum Resources: Accommo-
dation or Adjudication?, 11 HARv. INT'L L.J. 358 (1970); Cromelin, Offshore Oil and
Gas Rights: A Comparative Study, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457 (1974).
153. Taylor, supra note 152, at 373; Henri, supra note 113, at 832.
154. 420 U.S. 515, 517-18; Henri, supra note 113, at 827; Morris, supra note 152, at
1056.
155. 420 U.S. at 519-28.
156. Id. at 528. The United States was also forced to assert its paramount rights
to the outer continental s helf in United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla.
1969). In Ray, the United States obtained an injunction to prevent private con-
struction atop several coral reefs underlying the high seas about four miles off the
Florida coast. Private entrepreneurs claimed that the reefs were islands, discov-
ered by them, and subject to their colonization as an island nation. The federal
government, however, maintained that the proprietary interests in the coral reefs
belonged to the United States. The court concluded that all private proprietary
claims to the reefs were without merit. Id. at 542. For a discussion of the Ray
case, see Note, International Law--Continental Shelf-Proprietary Interest of
United States in Continental Shelf Precludes Claims of Acquisition by Private En-
trepreneurs, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 487 (1969); Note, Law of the Sea-The Continen-
tal Shelf-United States Proprietary Claim to the Continental Shelf Gives Rise to
a New Public Domain, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 509 (1970).
D. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953
The SLA established the coastal and seaward boundaries for
federal and state governmental jurisdiction 57 and provided the
states with "the right and power to manage, administer, lease, de-
velop, and use"158 the submerged lands and their resources in ac-
cordance with applicable state law.15 9 The SLA did not authorize
federal leasing for OCS oil and gas resources. 60 The Act merely
established that the seabed and.subsoil in the OCS beyond state
boundaries appertained to the United States and was subject to
its jurisdiction and control.161 The Truman Proclamation of 1945
also did not provide for the leasing of the OCS by the federal gov-
ernment-a power vested in Congress, not the President.162 The
Proclamation only asserted jurisdiction and control in the United
States of the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the
adjacent continental shelf.163 Further, it was held that offshore
submerged lands were not covered by the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of 1920.164 Therefore, the federal government was unable to
lease oil and gas resources on the continental shelf.
To remedy this situation, Congress enacted, concurrent with
and as a corollary to the SLA, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act of 1953 (OCSLA).165 The OCSLA provided the federal govern-
ment with authority to lease mineral resources1 66 on the sub-
157. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 specifically confirmed United States ju-
risdiction and control over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the
continental shelf lying seaward and outside of the three-mile marginal sea. 43
U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
158. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 57, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1464.
159. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
160. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 57, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1464.
161. 43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
162. Stone, supra note 146, at 484-85.
163. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
164. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease lands owned by the United
States for development and production of oil, gas, and certain other minerals. At-
tempts were made to obtain leases to offshore minerals under the Act but it was
held that offshore submerged lands were not covered. Justheim v. McKay, 229
F.2d 29, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
165. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 57, reprinted in 978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1464; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976). \
For a discussion of the OCS Lands Act of 1953, see generally Krueger, An Evalu-
ation of the Provisions and Policies of the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act, 10
NAT. RESOURCES J. 763 (1970); Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act:
Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1953); Krueger, supra note 76; Stone,
supra note 145.
166. The OCS Lands Act defined mineral lease as "any form of authorization
for the exploration for, or development or removal of deposits of oil, gas, or other
minerals." 43 U.S.C. 1331(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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merged lands lying seaward of the state waters to the edge of the
continental shelf.167 This area was titled "Outer Continental
Shelf' because of its location on the continental shelf outside
coastal state waters1 68 The OCSLA declared "that the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition."169 The OCSLA is "best viewed as a legislative imple-
mentation of the 1945 Truman Proclamation and the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf."170 Accordingly, the OCSLA
focused primarily on the need to develop OCS oil and gas re-
sources, 171 and provided the Secretary of the Interior with broad
authority to conduct the leasing program with little or no policy
guidance. 72
Federal OCS leasing proceeded slowly during the 1950's and
1960's with its impact confined to the Gulf of Mexico and the
southern California coast.' 73 The nation's energy stores were se-
cure and it was expected that offshore production of oil and gas
resources would serve as a supplement to production from on-
shore fields. There was, therefore, little national interest and min-
imal congressional oversight of OCS leasing activities. 74 A major
change occurred in the public's perception of offshore oil and gas
operations when an OCS drilling project in the Santa Barbara
167. Id. at §§ 1334, 1337.
168. Murphy & Belsky, OCS Development: A New Law and a New Beginning, 7
COASTAL ZONE MGmrr. J. 297, 300 (1980). See also Christopher, supra note 164, at 24-
28; H.R. REP. No. 215, supra note 113, at 6, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 1390. Thus, the Act defined the OCS as all lands lying seaward and
outside of state waters (three miles) "and of which the subsoil and seabed apper-
tain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976).
169. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1) (Supp. V 1981). The Act does not define a specific outer
geographical limit for its applicability, nor does it limit jurisdiction of the United
States over continental shelf resources. Stone, supra note 146, at 485. The legisla-
tion does make clear "that the character of the waters above the outer Continental
Shelf as high seas and the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be af-
fected." 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2) (Supp. V 1981).
170. Krueger, The Management of Federal Petroleum Resources in the United
States, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 61, 69 (1978) (footnote omitted). ,
171. H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 165, at 2, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 2177-78.
172. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 57, reprinted in 1978 US. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1464.
173. Murphy & Belsky, supra note 168, at 300; H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35,
at 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1481.
174. Murphy & Belsky, supra note 168, at 300; H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35,
at 102, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1509.
Channel was the scene of a massive blowout in January, 1969.
The resulting oil spill damage to the local ecology focused na-
tional attention on the federal OCS leasing program. 7 5
In 1974, OCS resources again became the focus of national in-
terest. Concerned about decreasing onshore domestic energy
supplies, increasing dependence on foreign imports, and exacer-
bated by the Arab oil boycott of 1973-74, President Nixon directed
the Secretary of the Interior to increase the amount of acreage on
the OCS to be leased to private industry in 1975 to ten million
acres. The acceleration of OCS leasing was to occur primarily in
frontier areas off the coast of Alaska. 176 The ten million acre lease
proposal crystalized growing concern by environmental and citi-
zen organizations, fishing interests, and coastal states over the
possible adverse impact of the proposed rapid development.
77
Coastal states and local communities were especially concerned
about the acceleration of the OCS leasing program, arguing that it
was their beaches, estuaries, and other shoreline areas which
could be severely damaged by an OCS-related spill. It was their
onshore coastal lands which would be the sites for the necessary
support facilities. It was their coastal communities which would
experience possible "boom town" effects from the offshore devel-
opment.' 78 Despite the state and local interests, OCS leasing re-
mained a federal decision and a federally administered program
175. Murphy & Belsky, supra note 168, at 300; H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35,
at 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1481. On January 28, 1969,
a Union Oil Company well anchored six miles off the California coast suffered a
severe blowout which resulted in the largest oil spill in United States history. The
oil slick covered eight hundred square miles of the ocean's surface and polluted
forty miles of the California coast. For discussion on the blowout, see Walmsley,
Oil Pollution Problems Arising out of Exploitation of the Continental Shelf: The
Santa Barbara Disaster, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 514, 516 (1972); Note, Continental
Shelf Oil. Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution Control, 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 113, 114-15 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 74, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1481.
In the aftermath of the oil spill, the Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hickel, at-
tempted to suspend indefinitely further offshore lease activity in the Santa Bar-
bara Channel. Union Oil initially prevailed in a suit brought against the
Department when the court of appeals upheld Union's contention that an open-
ended, indefinite suspension of the right to install a platform amounted to a can-
cellation of Union's lease and, therefore, a taking which required compensation
under the fifth amendment. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th
Cir. 1975) (later vacated, remanded for reconsideration of issues not covered). For
a discussion on the Union Oil litigation, see Note, Environmental Law: Govern-
mental Suspension of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Drilling Operations, 30 OKLA. L.
REV. 930 (1977).
176. Murphy & Belsky, supra note 168, at 301; H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35,
at 89, 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1496, 1506-07.
177. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 89, 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1496, 1506-07.
178. Id. at 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1496.
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over which coastal states received no financial assistance. Monies
received from OCS bonuses, rentals, and royalties were and are
deposited into the United States Treasury-not the treasuries of
the affected coastal states-and there is no revenue sharing pro-
gram between the federal and state governments. 79
Coastal states and local governments also disapproved of the
OCSLA leasing process in which the affected state governments
had no significant participation and no access to essential infor-
mation.180 The OCSLA of 1953 provided an open-ended grant of
authority to the Secretary of the Interior to conduct mineral leas-
ing on the OCS.181 The OCSLA was characterized in a congres-
sional report as "essentially a carte blanche delegation of
authority to the Secretary of the Interior."182 The report further
noted that specific mechanisms were needed to involve coastal
states, local governments, and the public in OCS decision-
making.183
The OCSLA's grant of total discretion to the Secretary of the
Interior enabled major oil companies to exercise a dominant role
in the setting of national OCS policy. In Energy Under the
Oceans, a study prepared by the University of Oklahoma, it was
stated that:
179. Id.
180. Id. The executive director of the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission testified before a congressional committee:
[T] he thing that makes planning in regard to the OCS oil so difficult is it
is impossible to understand what the full ramifications are on the basis of
anything we have received from the Interior Department .... It is just
the uncertainty that makes this so exceedingly difficult to deal with.
S. REP. No. 277, supra note 12, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 1777.
State and local officials also testified that their dealings with the Department of
Interior were unsatisfactory and that the federal government frequently disre-
garded the interests of state and local governments, as well as those of the tax-
payer. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 104, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1510.
181. Id. at 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1507.
182. Id. at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1461.
183. Id. The report explained:
Federal administration of the leasing program and Federal regulation of
offshore oil and gas development have been essentially a closed process
involving the Secretary of the Interior and the oil industry .... Decision-
making for the development of offshore oil and gas must be opened so
that the coastal and other States affected by offshore oil and gas activities
may participate in the process on a regular basis and so that affected local
communities and the public at large may have an opportunity to be
heard....
Id.
In the case of making and administering OCS policy, direct, continuous
participation has been largely limited to the petroleum industry and gov-
ernment .... Since government and industry have had almost identical
policy objectives, policy has been made and administered with extraordi-
nary ease....
... Within the Department itself, many of the Secretary's advisors are
either recruited from industry or are persons who have spent a part of
their careers in industry.
At the operational level, detailed OCS orders regulating OCS develop-
ment have been and are the product of a process of industry-government
cooperation....
... It is clear that the pattern of government-industry relationships
which has been developed has produced a very closed system for making
and administering OCS policies.' 8 4
Dissatisfaction with the OCS developmental framework in the
OCSLA led to increased congressional oversight of the program.
Congressional concern over the direction of the OCS leasing pro-
gram led to the establishment of the House Ad Hoc Select Com-
mittee on the Outer Continental Shelf.185 The creation of this
committee in the 94th Congress resulted from public concern
about the direction the OCS leasing program was taking under
the authority of the OCSLA. Furthermore, Congress was con-
cerned that delay and parliamentary confusion would result from
the multiple referrals required to amend the OCSLA, due to over-
lapping jurisdictions within the House committee structure. Bills
to amend the OCSLA would be referred to three or more House
committees. The Ad Hoc Select Committee would consolidate
184. D. KASH, I. WHITE, K. BERGEY, M. CHARTOCK, M. DEVINE, R. LEONARD, S.
SALOMON, & H. YOUNG, ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
OF OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS 108 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS), reproduced in H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note
35, at 103, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1509-10. The study
also stated that the "government and the petroleum industry shared common
goals for the development of OCS oil and gas .... The relationship was and con-
tinues to be close. In fact many individuals move into and out of both government
and industry. . . ." ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS, supra at 103-04. See also H.R.
REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
at 1461 (suggesting coastal and other states affected by offshore oil and gas activi-
ties participate in the decisionmaking process for development of such activities).
185. In discussing needed changes in the OCS Lands Act of 1953, Senator Jack-
son stated that the OCSLA:
did not provide clear policy guidance to govern [OCS] leasing. The bill
has never been amended, though times and conditions have changed dras-
tically in the intervening years. These developments (improved technol-
ogy, decline ofi onshore production, increased importance of OCS
resources, increased environmental and coastal awareness, new intergov-
ernmental cooperation efforts, and accelerated lease schedules) empha-
size the need for legislation that reflects the changes of the last 20 years
and the growing importance of this great national resource.
H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 101, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 1508.
[Vol. 11: 9, 19831 Shelf Energy Resources
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
multiple committee jurisdictions and thus simplify and expedite
consideration of the OCS legislation.18 6 This involvement, in-
tended to provide comprehensive guidelines for secretarial action,
culminated in the 1978 amendments.
E. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
(OCSLAA),187 the product of five years of congressional study,188
respond to four criticisms of the 1953 OCS Lands Act. The first
criticism was directed at the leasing method. Consumer activists
and political liberals claimed that the primary leasing method in
use (cash bonus bidding with a fixed royalty) had not produced
competitive results, that the federal government had not received
fair market value for its leases, and that the major petroleum
companies had enjoyed an unfair advantage in the lease-sale mar-
ket because of the substantial amounts of capital required to suc-
cessfully bid on OCS tracts. Second, land use planners wanted
the federal government to increase significantly its economic
planning role in respect to the development of OCS oil and gas re-
sources. Third, there was a lack of specific mechanisms to mean-
ingfully involve coastal states in OCS decisions. 189 Finally, no
provision of the OCSLA existed for coordination and compensa-
tion for injury to other users of the OCS. The OCSLA did not im-
pose liability for the effects of oil pollution resulting from
activities on the OCS. Therefore, private groups, such as
fishermen whose use of the OCS conflicted with offshore energy
development, wanted financial protection against the risk of loss
which they might bear as a result of OCS energy development.
186. H.R. REP. No. 590, rupra note 35, at 95-96, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1502. See also Murphy & Belsky, supra note 168, at 301-07.
For reports on the activities of the Ad Hoc Select Committee on the OCS, see H.R.
REP. No. 1783, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); H.R. REP. No. 1835, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1979); H.R. REP. No. 1214, upra note 25, at 113. Oversight of the OCS program
pursuant to the OCSLAA :falls under the jurisdiction of approximately eleven
standing committees of the House, and about eleven federal executive depart-
ments. H.R. REP. No. 1214, supra note 25, at 12. . , w
187. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456-1456a, 1464 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 43,U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356,
1801-1866 (Supp. IV 1980). For the legislative history of the 1978 OCS Amend-
ments, see H.R. REP. No. 5910, supra note 35; S. REP. No. 1091, 95 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); and S. REP. No, 284, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
188. Krueger & Singer, supra note 36, at 910.
189. Governors of coastal states argued that they should -be given increased au-
thority over decisions concerning the location, timing, and scope of OCS energy
operations conducted in adjacent offshore waters.
These groups wanted economic impact or damage insurance
funds in the event of another Santa Barbara-type incident,
thereby avoiding litigation. 9 0
The OCSLAA "is a comprehensive rewriting of the original 1953
OCS Act and involved substantial revision of existing practices
and regulation."191 Thirteen important goals were identified, and
each will be discussed briefly.' 92
1. National Policy for the Outer Continental Shelf
The OCSLAA declares that the OCS "is a vital national re-
source reserve held by the Federal Government for the public,
190. Jones, Mead, & Sorenson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 885, 886 (1979). Other critical analyses of the
1953 OCS Lands Act are discussed in Miron, The Outer Continental Shelf-Manag-
ing (or Mismanaging) its Resources, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 267 (1971); Montgomery,
The Multiple Use Concept As the Basis of a New Outer Continental Shelf Legisla-
tive Policy, 62 Ky. L.J. 327 (1974); Coulter, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act-Its Adequacies and Limitations, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 725 (1971).
For a discussion of the background of the 1978 OCS Amendments, see Cole, The
Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1976: An Inadequate
Guide to Outer Continental Shelf Development, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 358'(1977);
Jackson, Rational Development of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas, 54 OR. L.
REV. 567 (1975); Heller, The Federal Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program, 11
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 669 (1979); Moore, The OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978-
1980 and Beyond, 31 Om & GAS INST. 293 (1980); Comment, The Outer Continental
Shelf- Bridging the Information Gap Through Regulation, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 617;
Krueger & Singer, supra note 34; Murphy & Belsky, supra note 169; Comment, The
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978: Balancing Energy Needs
with Environmental Concerns?, 40 LA. L. REv. 177 (1977).
191. H.R. REP. No. 1214, supra note 25, at 13. "With the exception of one limited
amendment, the OCSLA remained untouched until 1978, although statutes were
passed that applied to OCS areas and operations." Id. at 5.
192. The goals were:
(1) Declare a national policy for OCS development.
(2) Improve the provisions for lease administration.
(3) Require the submission by the lessee of exploration, development
and production plans.
(4) Provide for the suspension or temporary prohibition of lease activi-
ties, or lease cancellation.
(5) Revise the bidding systems.
(6) Direct the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a five-year leasing
plan.
(7) Provide coastal states with an increased role in federal OCS deci-
sions.
(8) Provide for an OCS information program.
(9) Provide for safety standards, including the use of the best available
and safest technology where economically achievable.
(10) Provide procedures for citizen suits to enforce provisions of the
Act.
(11) Establish an Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund.
(12) Establish a Fishermen's Contingency Fund.
(13) Establish the Coastal Energy Impact Program to provide federal
grants to impacted coastal states.
H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 1462. See also 43 U.S.C. § 1802 (Supp. V 1981).
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which should be made available for expeditious and orderly de-
velopment, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner
which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and
other national needs."'193 It expressly recognizes that in view of
the impacts on the coastal zone from OCS development, the
coastal states may require assistance in protecting their coastal
zones and should participate in OCS policy and planning
decisions.194
The OCSLAA provides that the OCS program must be guided
by five main policy objectives. These are: (1) rapid development
of OCS petroleum resources; (2) balancing OCS energy develop-
ment with protection of the environment; (3) insuring the public a
fair return in exchange for development of the resources of the
OCS; (4) preserving and maintaining free enterprise and competi-
tion among firms bidding for OCS oil and gas leases; and (5) pro-
viding coastal states with an opportunity to participate in policy
and planning decisions relating to OCS development.195 These
policies are intended "to achieve national economic and energy
policy goals, assure national security, reduce dependence on for-
eign sources, and maintain a favorable balance of payments in
world trade."196
2. Administration of the OCSLA and the Leasing Process
The discovery, development, and production of oil and gas from
the OCS in the United States is performed by the private sector.
Individual companies lease from the federal government the
rights to perform these activities. Within the federal government
primary responsibility for OCS supervision is given to the Secre-
tary of the Interior. 9 7 'Within the Department of the Interior, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administered the leasing
provisions of the OCSLA and the United States Geological Survey
(USGS) had the primary responsibility for overseeing the devel-
opment of a tract once it had been leased. 98
193. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (Supp. V 1981).
194. Id. at § 1332(4).
195. Id. at § 1802(2-6), § 1332(4).
196. Id. at § 1802(1).
197. Id. at §§ 1331(b), 1334(a), 1337(a), 1344.
198. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1466.
The BLM: (a) received tract nominations and selected tracts to be included in a
lease sale; (b) prepared an environmental impact statement for each sale; (c) pre-
On January 19, 1982, former Interior Secretary Watt established
the Mineral Management Service (MMS).199 One of its purposes
was to manage all OCS activities, supervision of which, before the
consolidation, was scattered throughout the Interior Depart-
ment.200 Watt explained that moving all OCS activities into the
new MMS would:
(1) Establish accountability to the secretarial and congressional (OCS)
oversight committees.
(2) Save costs by avoiding duplication of effort and overlapping
functions.
(3) Enable [the) Interior [Department], through a more efficient leas-
ing program, to more effectively balance protection of the marine and
coastal environments with developmental and security needs of the
nation.
2 0 1
In addition to reorganizing the Interior Department's adminis-
tration of the OCS program, Secretary Watt approved proposals
to streamline the pre-sale planning process. These changes in the
OCS leasing system were designed to reduce the planning time of
sales, increase the amount of acreage offered in each sale, permit
early entry into OCS areas with high energy potential, and utilize
market forces to select areas for offshore leasing and
pared an economic, engineering, and geological evaluation of tracts to be sold; (d)
received the bids and determined whether the leases should be awarded to the
highest biiders on individual tracts; (e) received revenues from lease sales; and
(f) granted rights-of-way for pipelines. Id.
The USGS: (a) issued and enforced detailed regulations and special OCS or-
ders and notices covering operational activities; (b) issued pre-lease geophysical
and geological exploration permits; (c) approved post-lease exploration and devel-
opment plans, including the issuing of permits for both exploratory and develop-
ment drilling; and (d) collected royalties. Id.
199. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRE-
TARIAL ORDER NUMBER 3071 (Jan. 19, 1982).
200. Office of the Secretary, United States Dep't of the Interior, News Release,
(Dec. 3,1982); Jennrich, New MMS Setup Aims to Smooth OCS Leasing, Oil & Gas
J., June 7, 1982, at 66, 67.
Secretarial Order No. 3071 carried out a recommendation of the Linowes Com-
mission which Secretary Watt had previously appointed to study measures the
federal government could take to save some of the money lost through poor man-
agement of oil and gas lease receipts. On May 10, 1982, the Secretary expanded
MMS responsibilities by signing Secretarial Order No. 3071, Amendment No. 1,
consolidating Interior's OCS functions within the MMS. Thus, the MMS was the
result of allegations of royalty mismanagement under the USGS's conservation di-
vision. The organizational structure of the MMS closely resembles the United
States Geological Survey's conservation division. It has been reported that the
"MMS was created .. . by simply changing the name of the Geological Survey's
Conservation division to the MMS." Jennrich, supra at 67; Office of the Secretary,
United States Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Fact Sheet 2
(May 28, 1983).
201. Jennrich, supra note 200, at 67. For a discussion of conflicts that may arise
between federal agencies in managing the OCS, see Finn, Interagency Relation-
ships In Marine Resource Conflicts: Some Lessons From OCS Oil and Gas Leas-
ing, 4 HARv. ENrLv. L. REV. 359 (1980).
50
[Vol. 11: 9, 19831 Shelf Energy Resources
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
exploration.202
The streamlined leasing program initiated by Secretary Watt in-
troduced three basic changes into the pre-lease planning pro-
cess: 203 pre-call activities, call for information, and area
identification. 2 4 Pre-call activities are activities that take place
prior to the call for information. These activities include the prep-
aration by the MMS of a geology report, environmental analysis,
exploration report, and modeling studies concerning socio-eco-
nomic effects, oil spills, and air quality. Under the new program,
the early submission of geology, exploration and development re-
ports, and the area-wide offering concept under the streamlined
202. Interior Proposes Final Five-Year OCS Sale Plan, Oil & Gas J., May 24,
1982, at 44; Edwards, Reagan Administration Brings New Approach to Federal
OCS Leasing, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981, at 203; OCS Leasing Proposal Keyed to
Market Forces, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 22, 1982, at 56; Reagan Energy Policy Plan Tied to
Free Market, Oil & Gas J., July 20, 1981, at 22.
203. The following is a brief description of the OCS leasing process under the
traditional procedures, and under the streamlined method:
Under the traditional procedures, the Department issued a "call for nomi-
nations on large areas encompassing tens of millions of acres. Industry,
States, and other concerned groups responded to the call by nominating
specific tracts to be included or deleted from the lease sale. Using the in-
dustry nominations" and U.S. Geological Survey evaluations of potential
hydrocarbon resources as a guide, DOI then narrowed the area to those
tracts which appeared to be the most promising for lease. An environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) was then prepared on these tracts. Addi-
tional tracts were deleted if the EIS showed them to be especially
sensitive to environmental damage. USGS then calculated a value of the
resources in each tract. The tracts remaining after this extensive narrow-
ing process were then offered for lease.
Under the Secretary's streamlining changes, the call for nominations
will be replaced by a call for information on an entire planning area rang-
ing from 8 million to 133 million acres. Industry will define its areas of in-
terest in the call for information. An environmental impact statement will
then be prepared on the entire planning area. The method of resource
evaluation will be changed, and the evaluations will be performed after
the sale rather than before. The EIS will be published at the same time as
the proposed notice of sale, 4 months before the date of sale. The exact
tracts to be leased will be announced in the final notice of sale, I month
before the sale.
HOUSE REPORT ON THE FIVE.YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 5, at 7 (footnote
omitted).
204. See Interior Fine Tunes Plan for Leasing on OCS, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 4, 1982,
at 73; Changes in OCS Leaing Procedures Brighten U.S. Outlook Offshore, Oil &
Gas J., May 4, 1981, at.93; Industry Backs Area-Wide Sale of OCS Blocks, Oil & Gas
J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 54; Edwards, Reagan Administration Brings New Approach to
Federal OCS Leasing, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981. For a comparison of the tradi-
tional leasing procedures against the streamlined leasing methods, see FINAL SUP-
PLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR OCS
OIL & GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JAN. 1982-DEC. 1986 17-22 [hereinafter cited as
FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASE SCHEDULE I.
process will accelerate the eventual preparation of the final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) by about twenty-two
months. 205
The second major change involves an increase in private indus-
try involvement during the early stages of the leasing process.
Whereas in the past the Department of the Interior personnel
made unilateral determinations as to the areas to be leased, the
new process utilizes a call for information to be issued to the pri-
vate sector inviting comments from potential bidders regarding
desirable leasing areas.206 The Secretary wanted "the market and
not the Government [to] decide which tracts are the most promis-
ing [for the discovery of oil and gas], and which merit a priority
in terms of scarce U.S. investment dollars."2 07 The petroleum in-
205. FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASE SCHEDULE, supra note 204,
at 22-29; COLLIGNON, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL; GAS INFORMATION PROGRAM:
GULF OF MEXICO INDEX, DEC. 1980-AUG. 1982 20-21.
206. FINAL EIS Su'pP. ON THE FrVE-YEAR OCS LEASE SCHEDULE, supra note 204,
at 19; COLLIGNON, supra note 205, at 21-22. For a description of the "call for nomi-
nations" process used under the traditional leasing procedures, see supra note
200.
207. Senate Hearings on the Five- Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 14, 15
(statement of Interior Secretary James G. Watt). The rationale for area-wide of-
ferings is as follows:
(1) Significant domestic energy resources are believed to be located on
the OCS, but the precise quantities and locations are unknown because
promising frontier areas have not been explored thoroughly.
(2) Different geologists develop different interpretive views on the prob-
able location of oil and gas in any one planning area.
(3) The best way to accelerate discovery of significant oil and gas depos-
its is to encourage companies to pursue unique and diverse exploration
strategies based on these different views.
(4) In the [past] process the Federal government makes judgements
[sic] about which tracts are or are not likely to be bid on. The stream-
lined process will allow companies to concentrate their efforts on tracts
they consider most promising, unless those tracts have been deleted for
other reasons through the pre-sale planning process.
(5) The diverse exploration strategies which will be tested under the
streamlined process are necessary in order to fully test an area. Only a
small percentage of a planning area can be expected to contain economi-
cally producible resources and it would probably slow the geologic de-
lineation of an area if small portions of it are made available on a
piecemeal basis.
FINAL EIS Supp. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASE SCHEDULE, supra note 204, at 23.
The history of the search for hydrocarbons contains numerous examples of
years of fruitless drilling in a region, followed by a successful commercial discov-
ery, introducing an era of continued drilling success. Prudhoe Bay in Alaska, the
Hibernia field in the Canadian Atlantic, and the North Sea are all examples of this
drilling scenario. The Interior Department believes that by broadening the range
of possibilities from which industry can select to drill, it will expedite the discov-
ery of commercial deposits of oil and gas in the OCS. Id. Secretary Watt main-
tained that the streamlined leasing process "will attract many competitors who
will invest millions and billions of dollars in drilling operations that will prove suc-
cessful in delivering oil and gas to American consumers." Senate Hearings on the
Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of Interior Secretary
James G. Watt).
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dustry supports replacing the call for nominations with a call for
information, and maintains that "this broader scale evaluation of
a region is the most significant aspect of the [revised OCS]
program."208
The third major change in the pre-lease planning period is the
substitution of area identification for the tentative tract selection
process used previously. Area identification formally announces
the area on which the EIS analysis will be focused, and the area
which will eventually be considered for leasing. Unlike the tenta-
tive tract selection process which focused its EIS analysis on spe-
cific individual tracts, the area identification process will prepare
an EIS for the entire planning area.20 9
3. Exploration, Development, and Production Plans by the
Lessee
Prior to commencing exploration operations under an oil and
gas lease, the lessee submits an exploration plan to the Secretary
of the Interior for approval.2 10 The Secretary must approve the
exploration plan within thirty days of its submission unless the
proposed activity "would probably cause serious harm or damage
to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to any
mineral... to the national security or defense, or to the marine,
coastal, or human environment," and the proposed activity cannot
be modified to avoid these impacts. 21 ' In addition to the explora-
tion plan, accompanying environmental reports must be submit-
ted.212 An assessment of the expected direct effects on the
208. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 3, supra note 62, at 89 (statement of R.H.
Nanz, Vice-President for Technology, Shell Oil Co.).
209. COLLIGNON, supra note 205, at 22-23; OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 2,
supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson West, Assistant Secretary for Pol-
icy, Budget, and Administration, United States Dep't of the Interior).
210. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 30 C.F.R. §§250.34-1(a)(1),250.57
(1982). An exploration plan should include: (1) the proposed type and sequence of
exploration activities to be undertaken; (2) a description of drilling vessels, plat-
forms, and other structures to be attached to the seabed, including safety and pol-
lution prevention and control features; (3) the types of geophysical equipment to
be used; (4) the approximate location of each proposed exploratory well; (5) an oil
spill contingency plan that sets forth the procedures, personnel, and equipment
that are to be used for preventing, reporting, and cleaning up spills of oil or waste
material; (6) other relevant geological and geophysical information; (7) an air-
quality analysis; and (8) other information deemed pertinent by the Secretary. Id.
211. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340(c)(1), 1334(a) (2) (A) (i) (Supp. V 1981).
212. The environmental report includes a detailed description of: (1) onshore
support and storage facilities; (2) the estimated number of people expected to be
onshore and offshore environments is also made.21 3
Before development and production activities can begin under
an oil and gas lease in any area of the OCS other than the Gulf of
Mexico,214 the lessee must submit a development and production
plan and an environmental report to the Secretary.2 15 The devel-
opment and production plan is accompanied by a statement
describing onshore facilities and operations other than those on
the OCS, proposed by the lessee to be used in the development
and production of oil and gas from the lease area.2 16
employed; (3) boat and aircraft traffic patterns and, the probable location of on-
shore transportation terminals; (4) the quantity and composition of wastes and
pollutants likely to be generated by exploration operation; (5) major supplies,
services, and resources needed for implementation of the exploration plan; and
(6) environmentally sensitive or potentially hazardous areas, including archaeo-
logical and cultural sites. 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-3(a) (1) (i) (1982).
213. Id. at § 250.34-3(a)(1)(ii). The exploration plan and environmental report
must be accompanied by a certificate of coastal zone consistency wherever the ac-
tivities described would significantly affect land and water uses in the coastal zone
of a state which has developed an approved coastal zone management program.
Any lessee conducting activities in their own leased area must do so in accordance
with an approved exploration plan and environmental report. In addition to an ap-
proved exploration plan and environmental report, lessees must obtain a permit
prior to exploratory drilling. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1),(2), (d), (e)(2) (Supp. V 1981);
30 C.F.R. §§ 250.34-1(a) (1), 250.34-1(a) (6) (ii), 250.34-3(a) (1) (iii), 250.36, (1982); 15
C.F.R. §§ 930.70-930.86 (1982).
214. Congress determined that it was inappropriate to require the submission
of development and production plans in non-frontier areas, such as the Gulf of
Mexico, which had already undergone substantial OCS activity, unless the Secre-
tary were to find that a plan was in the public interest. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra
note 35, at 165, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1571.
215. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The development and production
plan provides information on the nature and extent of the proposed development,
including: (1) the specific work to be performed; (2) a description of drilling ves-
sels, platforms, pipelines, or other facilities and operations located on the OCS to
be directly related to the proposed development and the labor, material, and en-
ergy requirements associated with the facilities and operations; (3) the location of
each well; (4) current interpretations of all available relevant geological and geo-
physical data; (5) a description of environmental safeguards and safety standards;
(6) a time schedule of development and production activities; and (7) such other
relevant information as the Secretary may require. 43 U.S.C. at § 1351(c); and 30
C.F.R. § 250.34-2(a) (1) (1982). The environmental report includes a description of:
(1) the location, type, and size of offshore and onshore operations; (2) the require-
ments for land, labor, material, and energy for the operations; (3) a schedule of
the onshore and nearshore development activities; (4) any environmental monitor-
ing systems proposed for use by the lessee; (5) pollution prevention contingency
plans and cleanup equipment; (6) the existing biological, physical, and human en-
vironment with an emphasis placed on those environmental values that may be
affected by the proposed development; and (7) an air quality analysis. An assess-
ment of the direct effects of implementation of the plan on the onshore and off-
shore activities is also included. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.34-3(b) (1) (i)-(iii),34-3(b) (4) (ii),
250.57 (1982).
216. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The onshore statement is not sub-
ject to the approval of the Secretary because his authority extends only to offshore
operations in federal waters. H.R. REP. No. 590, su pra note 35, at 166, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1572. Relevant state and local units of gov-
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The Secretary may approve, disapprove or require modification
of the proposed production and development plan. The Secretary
may disapprove a plan only if: (1) a lessee fails to demonstrate
that. he can comply with the requirements of applicable federal
law; (2) a plan cannot: be modified so as to be, to the maximum
extent possible, consistent with approved coastal zone manage-
ment programs of coastal states; (3) operations threaten national
security or national defense; or (4) the plan would probably cause
serious harm to an exceptional marine or coastal environment.2 17
4. Suspension or Temporary Prohibition of Lease Activities
and Lease Cancellation
Suspension can occur at the request of the lessee to facilitate
proper development of a lease, to allow for the construction or ne-
gotiation for use of transportation facilities or, more generally, to
further the national interest.218 The intention of this provision is
to provide for suspension so as to allow, for example, unitized ex-
ploration or development, common pipeline placement, or safe de-
livery by tankers.
219
Suspension is also permitted without any request by, and even
over the objection of the lessee, if there is a threat of serious, ir-
reparable, or immediate harm or damage to life (including fish
and other aquatic life), property, or mineral deposits of the envi-
ronment.220 Suspension may also occur where the lessee fails to
comply with a provision either of the Act, of the lease, or of the
regulations.22' The lessee can seek review of any such suspen-
sion through a proceeding in a United States district court.222
The Secretary is authorized to cancel any lease or permit at any
ernment have authority to review the proposed onshore activities and grant or
deny permission for them to proceed. Id.
217. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h) (1) (D) (Supp. V 1981).
218. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1981); 30 C.F.R. § 2 50.12(b)(1)(1982).
219. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 131, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1537.
220. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1981); 30 C.F.R. § 250.12(a) (1) (ii) (1982).
221. 30 C.F.R. § 250.12(a), (1) (i) (1982).
222. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1981). As the reason for the suspension
is usually not the fault of the lessee, any permit or lease affected by a suspension
or temporary prohibition is to be extended for the period of such suspension or
prohibition. However, if a suspension is the result of gross negligence or willful
violation of the terms of a lease or permit or of applicable regulations, no such ex-
tension is permitted. Id. a: § 1334(a) (1) (B).
time for environmental reasons, 223 for improper activities, or non-
compliance by a lessee or permittee. 224 An environmental cancel-
lation of a lease or permit is usually without any fault by the
lessee or permittee 22 5 and cannot occur until the operation under
the lease has been under continuous suspension or temporary
prohibition by the Secretary, with due extension of the term of
the lease for a period of five years or, upon the request of the
lessee, for a lesser period of time.226 Thus an environmental can-
cellation is a classic balancing of the harm or damage with the ad-
vantages of continued activity over a designated period of time.227
While a lease may also be cancelled for improper activities or
noncompliance, if the lease is a producing lease, such cancellation
must be by proceeding in an appropriate United States district
court. 228 A nonproducing lease, however, may be cancelled by the
Secretary, subject to judicial review, if noncompliance continues
for thirty days after a mailing of notice to the lessee of the im-
proper activities. 229 A lease cancellation for noncompliance or im-
proper activities by the lessee would ordinarily preclude
compensation to a lease holder.230
5. Revised Bidding Systems
The OCSLAA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to con-
duct a competitive bid lease sale. 231 The Department has tradi-
223. Id. at § 1334(a) (2) (A).
224. Id. at § 1334(c)-(d).
225. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 132, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1538. Such a cancellation may occur if the Secretary determines
that:
(i) continued activity pursuant to such lease or permit would probably
cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic
life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not leased), to the na-
tional security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or human environ-
ment;
(ii) the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or decrease to an
acceptable extent within a reasonable period of time; and
(iii) the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantages of continu-
ing such lease or permit in force.
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2) (A) (i)-(iii) (Supp. V 1981).
226. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
227. Id. at § 1334(a) (2) (A)-(B). Cancellation of a lease for environmental rea-
sons will become effective only after the affected lessee has been given notice and
an opportunity for a hearing. The determination by the Secretary after the hear-
ing would be subject to review in an appropriate United States district court. Ade-
quate compensation would be granted to a lessee or permittee when cancellation
occurs through no fault of the lessee or permittee. Id. at §§ 1334(a)(2)(A)-(C),
(b) (1) (B).
228. Id. at § 1334(d).
229. Id. at § 1334(c).
230. Id. at § 1334(j).
231. Id. at § 1337(a) (1). Separate sealed bids are submitted for each tract bid
upon. The opening of bids is for the purpose of publicly announcing and recording
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tionally leased OCS lands for oil and gas development under a
bonus bid, fixed royalty rate bidding system. Under this system,
companies submit cash bids, commonly called bonuses, for the
right to explore and develop OCS tracts. These bonuses are paid
before exploration and are not refundable. If production should
occur, companies pay the federal government a fixed royalty-tra-
ditionally 16 2/3% of the value of oil and gas produced. Under
this system, whoever puts up the most "front-end" money is
awarded the lease.232 The advantages of the traditional cash bo-
nus bidding system are clear: (1) it is easy to administer, because
leases are awarded on the basis of the total amount of dollars of-
fered; (2) it provides an incentive for early development and is
popular with industry; and (3) it affords the government a secure,
early return of revenue whether or not petroleum is discovered.
However, exclusive use of the cash bonus bidding method also
has disadvantages. First, it limits participation and competition in
OCS sales because of the large up-front bonus money needed to
obtain a lease. Second, the return to the federal government is
fixed no matter how much petroleum is eventually produced from
the tract. Therefore, the OCSLAA was designed to reduce the
front-end cash bonus, to make it easier for smaller oil companies
to enter the OCS development, and to increase the government's
return on actual production of petroleum.233
To achieve these goals, the OCSLA was amended to authorize
new bidding systems while retaining the competitive, sealed bid-
ding procedures and bonus and royalty bids.234 Bidding systems
the bids received. After the bid opening, the MMS/OCS regional office conducts a
review of the bids to determine which is the highest valid bid. Id. For discussion
on competitive bidding for offshore oil and gas leases, see A. SMILEY, COMPETrTIVE
BIDDING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE CASE OF OFFSHORE OIL (1979); Gilley & Karels,
The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 637
(1981).
232. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CONGRESS SHOULD EXTEND MANDATE TO EXPERIMENT WITH ALTERNATIVE BIDDING
SYSTEMS IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS 1 (May 27, 1983) (GAO/RCED 83-139) [here-
inafter cited as ALTERNATIVE BIDDING SYSTEMS]; THE GREAT GIVEAWAY, supra note
50, at 5.
233. McDonald, The Economics of Alternative Leasing Systems on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 18 Hous. L. REV. 967, 969-70 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note
35, at 47, 135-36, 290-95, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1453-54,
1541-42, 1644-48. For a discussion of entry into crude oil and gas production in the
United States, see Jones, Mead and Sorenson, Free Entry into Crude Oil and Gas
Production and Competition in the U.S. Oil Industry, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859
(1978).
234. 43 U.S.C § 1337(a) (1) (Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of alternative bid-
other than front-end bonus bids are to be applied to not less than
twenty-percent and not more than sixty-percent of the total area
offered for leasing each year during the five-year period beginning
on the date of enactment of the OCSLAA, unless the Secretary
determines that the requirements are inconsistent with the pur-
poses and policies of the Act.235 In this fashion, the OCSLAA was
seeking to promote four economic goals to guide OCS leasing pol-
icy: (1) economic efficiency; (2) competition among oil companies;
(3) securing a fair rate of return on the disposition of OCS re-
sources; and (4) administrative efficiency in administering the
leasing system. 236
6. Five-Year Leasing Program
One significant section of the OCSLAA directs the Secretary of
the Interior to weigh environmental and other risks against en-
ergy potential in determining how, when, and where OCS land
should be made available. To implement the policies of the OC-
SLAA, the Secretary is to prepare, approve, and maintain a five-
year leasing program, to review it at least every year, and to re-
view and reapprove it as appropriate. "The leasing program shall
consist of a schedule of proposed lease sales indicating ... the
size, timing, and location of leasing activity which he determines
will best meet national energy needs for the five-year period fol-
lowing its approval or reapproval."23 7
Management of the OCS leasing program is to be a balance of
the economic, social, and environmental impacts of oil and gas ac-
tivities. 2 38 In determining the timing and location of future oil
and gas operations in the various geographic regions, the leasing
program must consider the existing characteristics of the regions,
the need to share developmental benefits and environmental risks
among the various regions, the location of these regions with re-
spect to the needs of the various regional energy markets, the lo-
cations of the regions with respect to other uses of the sea and
seabed, the interest of oil and gas developers in a particular off-
ding systems, see S. MCDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FU-
ELS PRODUCTION 95-120 (1979); McDonald, supra note 233. For a discussion of the
federal energy leasing policy, see McDonald, Federal Energy Resource Leasing
Policy, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 747 (1978).
235. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981). The major court cases interpreting
the bidding provisions of the OCSLAA are Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus,
631 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1979); and Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 654 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd, Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
236. Gilley, Karels & Lyon, The Economics of Oil Lease Bidding, 18 Hous. L.
REV. 1061, 1062-63 (1981).
237. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (Supp. V 1981).
238. Id. § 1344(a)(1).
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shore area, the environmental nature and marine productivity of
the various OCS areas, and relevant environmental or predictive
information concerning the different OCS areas. In addition, the
Secretary is to consider the views of affected coastal states as to
any relevant laws or policies which have been specifically identi-
fied by the Governors of such states.23 9 The selection, timing, and
location of leasing areas must, to the maximum extent possible,
maintain a proper balance between the potential for environmen-
tal damages, petroleum discovery, and adverse impact on the
coastal zone. 240 Finally, leasing activities must assure receipt of
fair market value for the tracts leased and the permits granted by
the Federal Government. 241
7. Coordination and Consultation with Affected States and
Local Governments
As previously noted, the OCSLA provided an open-ended grant
of authority to the Secretary to conduct leasing on the OCS to the
exclusion of the coastal state and local governments. One assess-
ment of the process noted:
[I]n the case of OCS development, States and localities find themselves
limited to reacting to Federal decisions which set in motion chains of
events that can affect population levels, employment patterns, require-
ments for State and local expenditures for public facilities and services,
and social patterns. With key OCS decisions being made at the Federal
level, States, can only approve or disapprove location of refineries, plat-
form construction sites, and service bases; or react favorably or unfavora-
bly to general oil company efforts to build OCS-support facilities. They
cannot participate in the process which leads to such decisions. Their
only option is to try to exercise their legal rights to choose whether or not
to approve OCS-related facilities after the fact of Federal decisions, oil
company investment, and actual oil discoveries.2 4 2
This authority was based on the assumption that offshore produc-
tion would be a relatively small supplement to the nation's on-
shore production.243
239. Id. § 1344(a)(2).
240. Id. § 1344(a) (3).
241. Id. § 1344(a)(4).
242. Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, Coastal Effects
of Offshore Energy Systems: An Assessment of Oil and Gas Systems, Deepwater
Ports, and Nuclear Powerplants Off the Coast of New Jersey and Delaware 156
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Systems 1.
243. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 102, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1509. In 1953, when the OCSLA was enacted, there was little rea-
son to provide procedures for state and citizen input into federal OCS decisions.
This situation has changed dramatically. Onshore reserves are now being discov-
This situation led to demands by coastal states for more mean-
ingful participation in offshore leasing policy decisions. Although
such demands were ignored for many years, in 1975 the Interior
Department established an OCS Advisory Board composed of
designated state representatives. Its function, however, was lim-
ited to overseeing offshore environmental monitoring programs
and the board quickly passed a resolution in 1977 declaring the
need for greater state participation in the OCS process. 24 4
In response to the concern for state and local input, the OC-
SLAA included a section which provided that any governor of an
affected coastal state may make specific recommendations to the
Secretary regarding the size, timing, or location of a proposed
lease sale or on a proposed development and production plan 24S
within sixty days after notice of a proposed lease sale or after re-
ceipt of a development and production plan.246 The Secretary
shall accept such recommendations if he determines that they
provide a reasonable balance between the national interest and
the well-being of the citizens of the affected states. The determi-
nation of the national interest is to be based on the desirability of
obtaining oil and gas supplies in a balanced manner and on the
ered in increasingly smaller hydrocarbon fields. These fields are more expensive
and slower to produce than the larger oil fields discovered in the early 20th cen-
tury. For example, from 1971 to 1976, of the 38,000 onshore wells which have been
drilled in the continental United States, only five fields of over 100 million barrels
of oil have been discovered. In contrast, United States geological data project that
OCS oil and gas reserves may be found in large fields which can be developed
sooner than onshore petroleum fields. Id. at 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1481.
244. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 104-05, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, at 1510-11. The board resolved:
Whereas, the coastal States and local jurisdictions adjacent to areas that
are, or will be, subject to OCS development have routinely and continu-
ally supported the need for improvements in the OCS leasing and devel-
opment process; and
Whereas, such improvements include the need for greater consultation
with, and participation by, State and local governments, a more meaning-
ful and definitive role for the OCS Advisory Board, and greater protection
for environmental values and resources; and
Whereas, this support has been expressed in a variety of forms; and
Whereas, OCS leasing and development are proceeding at a rapid pace
without the needed legislative improvements being made; therefore, be it
Resolved, That the OCS Advisory Board urges the Secretary to urge the
United States Congress to take earliest possible action on legislation to
amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to strengthen the role of
State and local governments and the OCS Advisory Board in OCS leasing
and development decision, and provide increased protection for environ-
mental values and resources; and be it further
Resolved, That the OCS Advisory Board recommends that the Depart-
ment of the Interior support and work to achieve early passage of such
amendments to the OCS Lands Act.
Id.
245. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(a) (Supp. V 1981).
246. Id. at § 1345(b).
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findings, purposes, and policies of the Act.247 Any rejection by the
Secretary of a governor's recommendation is final and is not, by
itself, a basis for invalidating a proposed lease sale or a proposed
development and production plan.248
A similar procedure has been combined with the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) to en-
sure state and local government participation prior to final ap-
proval of development and production plans.249 Ordinarily,
approval of each development and production plan submitted by
lessees will not be a "major federal action" mandating the prepa-
ration of an EIS. However, the OCSLAA requires the Secretary
to declare the approval of a development and production plan to
be a major federal action mandating the preparation of an EIS
at least once in each frontier region of the OCS.250 When ap-
proval of a development and production plan is not found to be a
major federal action by the Secretary, the governors of affected
states and interested citizens may submit comments and
recommendations. 25 '
The Secretary is also authorized by OCSLAA to enter into co-
operative agreements with affected states. Such agreements may
provide for the sharing of information and joint utilization of ex-
pertise in order to facilitate permit procedures, joint planning and
review, and the formulation of joint surveillance and monitoring
arrangements to carry out applicable federal and state laws, regu-
lations, and stipulations relevant to OCS operations.252
8. OCS Information Programs
To provide the Secretary with sufficient environmental and ex-
ploratory information to make informed decisions about OCS de-
velopment, the OCSLAA established an Environmental Studies
Program2 53 and an OCS Oil and Gas Information Program.254 The
Environmental Studies Program, referred to as baseline and mon-
247. Id. at § 1345(c).
248. Id. at § 1345(d).
249. Id. at § 1351(a)(3).
250. Id. at § 1351(e)-(f).
251. Id. at § 1351(g).
252. Id. at § 1345(e).
253. Id. at § 1356.
254. Id. at § 1352. For a discussion of the OCS information programs, see Com-
ment, The Outer Continentai Shel/. Bridging the Information Gap Through Regu-
lation, supra note 190.
itoring studies, develops information concerning the environment
in an area to be leased, which is analyzed and then used as a ba-
sis to monitor effects. If an area or region is to be included in a
lease sale, a study is to be undertaken to establish baseline infor-
mation concerning the status of the environment of the OCS area
involved and of the coastal areas which may be affected by explo-
ration, development, and production in that area.255 The baseline
studies must include predictions of possible impact on the marine
environment resulting from oil spills, by-products of drilling activ-
ities, the laying of pipelines on the ocean floor, and the impact of
offshore development on affected onshore coastal areas. 256 Moni-
toring studies continue during OCS exploration, development,
and production to monitor changes in the OCS environment by
providing time-series data trend information which can be com-
pared with the original baseline data.257
The OCS Oil and Gas Information Program complements the
Environmental Studies Program by requiring lessees or permit-
tees conducting exploration for oil and gas to provide the Secre-
tary with access to all data and information obtained from such
activities. 258 The Secretary must make available to the affected
coastal states, and upon request to any affected local government,
a summary of data designed to assist them in planning for the on-
shore impacts of possible OCS development. This summary re-
port shall include estimates of: (1) the oil and gas reserves in
OCS areas leased or to be leased; (2) the projected size and tim-
ing of development; (3) the location of pipelines; and (4) the gen-
eral location and nature of onshore facilities. 25 9
The disclosure provisions of the Oil and Gas Information Pro-
gram help assure that the federal government receives fair mar-
ket value for the submerged lands leased, and assists the
Secretary in balancing the benefits of production in a specific area
of the OCS against the possible environmental consequences. 260
Furthermore, the Program enables the Secretary to conduct a
continuing investigation of the availability of the oil and gas re-
sources on the OCS.261 The Program also makes energy informa-
255. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981); H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at
154-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1560-61.
256. 43 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
257. Id. at § 1346(b). For a discussion of baseline and monitoring studies as a
technique in meeting management needs associated with the development of OCS
lands, see Burroughs, OCS Oil and Gas: Relationships Between Resource Manage-
ment and Environmental Research, 9 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 77 (1981).
258. 43 U.S.C. § 1352(a) (Supp. V 1981).
259. Id. at § 1352(b) (2).
260. Id. at § 1352(b)(1).
261. Id. at § 1865(c).
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tion available to the Department of the Interior, as well as other
federal agencies. 262
Congress was concerned that they relied too heavily on unveri-
fied information from industry sources in determining the availa-
bility of petroleum resources on the OCS. The investigation is to
be made independently by individuals outside the industry and is
to include an independent evaluation of industry and trade asso-
ciation data and a collection of data from other federal, state, and
local agencies. The Secretary of the Interior is to evaluate this
data and make an independent estimate of present and potential
OCS resources and the effect of these estimates on the energy re-
quirements of industry, commerce, and the national defense. In
order to provide for a proper investigation, the Secretary must de-
velop standardized objective criteria for comparison purposes. 2 63
9. Safety Standards and Enforcement
The OCSLAA recognized the need to provide for safe opera-
tions on the OCS. The OCSLAA makes it an explicit policy that:
operations in the Outer Continental Shelf should be conducted in a safe
manner by well-trained personnel using technology, precautions, and
techniques sufficient to prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts,
loss of well control, fires, spillages, physical obstruction to other users of
the waters or subsoil and seabed, or other occurrences which may cause
damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life or health.2 6 4 .
262. Id. at § 1865(a). The investigation conducted pursuant to this section was
the result of the congressional finding that:
(1) there is a serious lack of adequate basic energy information avail-
able to the Congress and the Secretary of the Interior with respect to the
availability of oil and natural gas from the Outer Continental Shelf;
(2) there is currently an urgent need for such information;
(3) the existing collection of information by Federal departments and
agencies relevant to the determinaton of the availability of such oil and
natural gas is uncoordinated, is jurisdictionally limited in scope, and relies
too heavily on unverified information from industry sources;
(4) adequate, reliable, and comprehensive information with respect to
the availability of such oil and natural gas is essential to the national se-
curity of the United States; and
(5) this lack of adequate reserve data requires a reexamination of past
data as well as the acquisition of adequate current data.
Id.
263. Id. at § 1865(a). The purpose of this investigation is to study the present
and potential OCS resources, based on verified, independent information, so as to
enable rational decision making by the Secretary of the Interior and the Congress
as to how to meet possible energy emergencies, and as to the establishment of en-
ergy pricing and conservation policies. Id. at § 1865(b).
264. Id. at § 1332(6).
The world's largest offshore oil rig, the Ocean Ranger, collapsed in a severe
On all new drilling operations, the best available and safest tech-
nology economically achievable is required. On existing facilities,
the safest technology available is required wherever
practicable. 265
In determining whether and when to require the use of the saf-
est technology available, the Secretary is charged with balancing
the increase in safety against any undue economic hardship on
the lessee or permittee. The existence of an undue economic
hardship is determined by weighing the incremental benefits
against the incremental costs. If the incremental benefits are
clearly insufficient when compared to the incremental costs, the
new technique, procedure, or equipment is not to be required. 266
10. Citizens' Suits and Judicial Review
The OCSLAA includes procedures by which concerned citizens
and governmental officials can participate in the enforcement of
the Act. Any person having a valid legal interest, which is or may
be adversely affected, has the right to commence a civil action on
his own behalf to compel compliance with the Act or regulations
promulgated thereunder. The action may be brought against any
person, including the United States, and any government agency
for alleged violation of the Act.267 The term "valid legal interest,"
which confers standing to sue, applies to those who have an eco-
nomic interest, those who have suffered or will probably suffer a
tortious injury, and those who may have a definable aesthetic or
environmental interest.268
The OCSLAA provides a different procedure for challenges to
certain decisions of the Secretary of the Interior. Congress noted
that review of the five-year leasing schedule would involve consid-
storm in the North Atlantic 170 miles east of Newfoundland, Canada. The incident
claimed 116 lives and "demonstrated once again that drilling at sea remains one of
the world's most dangerous professions." The Ocean Ranger's Night of Death,
Newsweek, Mar. 1, 1982, at 48.
265. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (Supp. V 1981).
266. Id. The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of the Department in
which the Coast Guard is operating and the Secretary of the Army are responsible
for enforcement of safety and environmental regulations promulgated pursuant to
the OCSLA. Failure to comply with any provision of the Act, implementing regu-
lations, or terms of a lease or permit could subject the violator to a maximum civil
penalty of $10,000 for each day of non-compliance, and a maximum criminal pen-
alty of $100,000, imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. Id. at
§§ 1348(a), 1350(b)-(c).
267. Id. at § 1349(a)(1).
268. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 161, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1567. It was the intent of Congress that standing for citizens' suits
would include persons who meet the requirement for standing to sue set out by
the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). H.R. REP. No. 590,
supra note 35, at 161, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1567.
64
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eration of various regional interests and problems; determination
of the propriety of the leasing program would necessitate balanc-
ing the needs and problems of regional areas as well as those of
the federal government. In order to provide for consolidated pro-
ceedings, judicial review of the leasing schedule is conducted only
in the United States court of appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.269 In contrast, review of an exploration plan or a develop-
ment and production plan would be in the United States court of
appeals for a circuit in which an affected state is located, closer to
the area for which the plan was submitted. 27 0 Suits concerning
actions by the Secretary may be brought only by a person who:
(1) participated in the administrative proceedings related to the
action; (2) is adversely affected or aggrieved by the action; (3)
filed a petition for review of the Secretary's action within sixty
days after the date of such action; and (4) promptly transmitted
copies of the petition to the Secretary and the Attorney
General.27 1
11. Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
The risk of oil pollution can be expected to increase as OCS
leasing activity accelerates. Congress, therefore, provided in the
OCSLAA for an oil spill liability fund to pay for the prompt re-
moval of any oil spilled or discharged as a result of OCS develop-
ment and for any damage to public or private interests caused by
such spills or discharges. 272
The Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund was established
in an amount not to exceed $200 million to be administered by the
Secretaries of Transportation and Treasury. 273 Injured parties
may assert claims for two types of economic loss arising out of or
directly resulting from oil pollution-removal costs and
damages. 2 74
269. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 162-63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1568; 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
270. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
271. Id. at § 1349(c)(3).
272. Id. at §§ 1811-1824. These sections apply to spills from any offshore facil-
ity or any transportation device actually in OCS waters. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra
note 35, at 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1484.
273. 43 U.S.C. § 1812(a) (Supp. V 1981). The fund is financed by the imposition
of a fee of three cents per barrel on all oil produced from the OCS and by revenue
obtained through fines, penalties, and reimbursements. Id. at § 1812(b), (d) (1).
274. Id. at § 1813(a). Claims for damages include injury to real or personal
property or natural resources; the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
While there are limitations placed upon the claims, 275 the Com-
pensation Fund in effect imposes strict liability upon the owners
and operators of vessels (other than public vessels) or offshore fa-
cilities for all types of losses caused by oil pollution. 276 The
amount of their liability, however, is limited except when the inci-
dent causing the oil pollution is the result of willful misconduct,
gross negligence, or the violation of safety standards of the fed-
eral government.277 Notwithstanding these limitations, an owner
or operator of an offshore facility or vessel from which an oil dis-
charge occurs will be liable for all costs of removal incurred by
any federal, state, or local governmental official or agency.278
To ensure government compensation, OCSLAA requires own-
ers or operators of offshore facilities and vessels to demonstrate
adequate financial responsibility to cover the liability require-
ments of the Act.279 Any vessel which fails to comply with the
financial responsibility requirement may be denied entry to any
United States port or place, or may be detained at any United
States port.280
due to injury to real or personal property or natural resources; and loss of tax rev-
enue for a period of one year due to injury to real or personal property. Id. at
§ 1813(a) (2).
275. Id. at § 1813(a)-1813(c). Any resident of the United States, the federal gov-
ernment, a state government, or political subdivision may assert a claim for re-
moval costs, injury to real or personal property, and for loss of use of real or
personal property or natural resources. Further, any of the above parties which
derive at least twenty-five percent of their earnings from activities which utilized
damaged property or natural resources may assert a claim for loss of profits or im-
pairment of earning capacity from injury to that property or those natural re-
sources. However, only the President, as trustee for OCS resources, and state
governments may assert a claim for injury to natural resources. The federal gov-
ernment and any state or political subdivision thereof may assert a claim for loss
of tax revenues for a period of one year due to injury to real or personal property.
Id.
276. Id. at § 1814(a).
277. When these exceptions do not apply, the liability of the owner or operator
of a vessel is limited to the greater of $250,000 or $300 per gross ton. The limitation
of liability does not apply when the owner or operator of a vessel fails or refuses
to cooperate with federal officials in furtherance of cleanup activities. The owner
or operator of an offshore facility is liable for the total cost of removal and cleanup,
and an amount limited to $35 million for total damages. Id. at § 1814(b).
278. Id. at § 1814(d). An owner or operator of an offshore facility or vessel
which is the source of oil pollution is not liable for any loss caused solely by an act
of war, by an unanticipated natural disaster, or by the negligent or intentional act
of the damaged party or any third party. Id. at § 1814(c).
279. Id. at § 1815(a) (1), (b). The owner or operator of any vessel or offshore fa-
cility which has the capacity for transporting, storing, transferring or otherwise
handling more than one thousand barrels of oil at any one time, shall establish
and maintain "evidence of financial responsibility" in the amount of $35 million.
Evidence of such financial responsibility may be established by any one of four
methods: (1) evidence of insurance; (2) guarantee; (3) surety bond; or (4) qualifi-
cation as a self-insurer. Id. at § 1815(a)(1).
280. Id. at § 1814(a) (2).
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The Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund is an alternative
to recovery of cleanup costs and actual damages through pro-
longed, expensive, and uncertain civil litigation. It is immediately
available to governmental agencies to finance the removal of
spilled oil and efforts to ameliorate a spill's impact on public
property.281
12. The Fishermen's Contingency Fund
There has been substantial local opposition to OCS leasing in
such frontier areas as the Georges' Bank off the Atlantic seaboard
and Alaskan waters by fishermen who fear negative impacts re-
sulting from OCS operations. 282 Congress acknowledged these
concerns and provided a mechanism to protect commercial
fishermen against economic loss resulting from OCS leasing. OC-
SLAA established a Fishermen's Contingency Fund in an amount
that may not exceed two million dollars to provide compensation
for damages to commercial fishing gear and any resulting eco-
nomic loss to commercial fishermen caused by OCS oil and gas
development activities. 283
The Fishermen's Contingency Fund was not designed to sup-
plant liability where responsibility or fault could be shown. There
are, therefore, restrictions on the payments of claims from the
fund.284 Commercial fishermen suffering injury may file claims,
281. Id. at § 1812(c).
282. See Comment, CLF v. Andrus and Oil Drilling on Georges Bank: The First
Circuit Attempts to Balance Conflicting Interests, 8 B.C. ENvrL AFF. L. REV. 201
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CLF]; Georges Bank Protection Act: Joint Hearing on
S. 2119 to Protect the Fisheries Resources on the Georges Bank Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Subcomm. on Energy
Resources and Materials Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Impact of Offshore Oil and Gas Develop-
ment on Georges Bank: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Busi-
ness, and the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the
Subcomm. on Energy Resources and Materials Production of the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); MacLeish, Resources:
Oil, Fish, and Georges Bank, The Atlantic, Sept. 1981, at 18.
283. 43 U.S.C. § 1842(a)-1842(b) (Supp. V 1981). The fund is financed by the col-
lection of an amount that shall not exceed $5,000 per year from the holders of OCS
leases, permits, easements, and pipeline rights-of-way. Payments from the fund
are to be made for demonstrated actual and consequential damages. Such dam-
ages include, but are not limited to, repair or replacement of the damaged fishing
items and loss of profits due to the damage of fishing gear by materials, equip-
ment, tools, containers, or other items associated with OCS activities. Id. at
§ 1842(c).
284. Id. at § 1843(c)(2).
which are presumed to be valid,285 for compensation. Such claims
are then referred to hearing examiners. 286 In the absence of a re-
quest for judicial review, a successful claimant is paid by the
fund, and the Secretary of Commerce acquires, by subrogation,
all rights of the claimant against any person found to be responsi-
ble for the damage. 287
13. Amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972-The Formula Grant Sections of the Coastal
Energy Impact Program
As previously noted, states do not receive revenue from federal
OCS leasing, but experience the social, economic, and environ-
mental impacts from OCS development. In response to coastal
states' requests for a portion of the revenues which accrue to the
federal government from the sale of leases on the OCS, Congress
passed the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976
(CZMAA).288 The CZMAA was enacted to provide federal
financial assistance to those states experiencing coastal energy
development. 289
The Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP), the principal pro-
vision of the CZMAA, is composed of three parts. Planning grants
are provided to states if their coastal zones are likely to be af-
fected by energy facilities or OCS energy activity. The eighty-per-
cent grants are to be used by states to study and plan for any
economic, social, or environmental consequences which result
from the location or operation of energy facilities in the coastal
zone, or to assist states in carrying out their responsibilities
under the OCSLA.290 The second part of CEIP involves loans and
285. Id. at § 1844. A claim for damages filed pursuant to the provisions of the
Fishermen's Contingency Fund is presumed valid if the claimant establishes that:
(1) the commercial fishing vessel was being used for fishing and was lo-
cated in an area affected by Outer Continental Shelf activities;
(2) a report on the location of the material, equipment, tool, container,
or other item which caused such damages and the nature of such damages
was made within five days after the date on which such damages were dis-
covered;
(3) there was no record on nautical charts for the Notice to Mariners on
the date such damages were sustained that such material, equipment,
tool, container, or other item existed in such area; and
(4) there was no proper surface marker or lighted buoy which was at-
tached or closely anchored to such material, equipment, tool, container, or
other item.
Id.
286. Id. at § 1845.
287. Id. at § 1845(h)(2).
288. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 194, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 1599.
289. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1982).
290. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (a)(1)(A)-(C), (c)(1)-(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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bond guarantees to coastal states to assist them in financing pub-
lic facilities and public services required as a result of coastal en-
ergy activity.291 The third part, the provision amended by the
OCSLAA, is the formula grant section. This provision provides
grants to coastal states impacted by OCS energy activity.292
To achieve a better balance in the distribution of formula funds
between coastal states presently engaged in OCS development
and frontier areas beginning to move into production, the formula
grant section of the CZMAA was amended by the OCSLAA.293
291. Id. at § 1456a(d).
292. Id. at § 1456a(b). Despite the enactment of the 1976 CZMAA, coastal states
continue to seek federal funding to help finance the public facility, public service,
and environmental protection requirements brought about by OCS energy opera-
tions. Coastal state representatives question the workability of the CEIP and, in
particular, the OCS formula grants, identifying six major problems.
First, the authorization level for the grants was not adequate to provide suffi-
cient funds to affected states. Second, the statutory provision that the grants are
to be used to ameliorate the negative impacts from new or expanded OCS opera-
tions precludes the use of the money for present impacts occurring from past or
ongoing OCS development in the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf states argued that this
provision penalized them for their cooperation in developing offshore petroleum
resources. Third, the CEIP formula, which computes each state's share of the
grant money, is confusing because it is based on the difficult concept of a state's
"adjacency" to a lease sale. The North Atlantic states have relatively small coast-
lines but may be major support areas for OCS development. Therefore, these
states argued that "adjacency" did not accurately determine actual impact for
OCS explorations. Fourth, frontier states object to the lack of funds available for
lease sales when a considerable amount of "start-up" costs would be incurred.
Fifth, states object to the formula grant restriction that prohibits states from using
grant money unless money in the loans and bond guarantee funds were unavaila-
ble. Finally, ambiguity in the disbursal method caused coastal states to conclude
that the grants would not be transmitted to them promptly after the Secretary had
made the calculations under the formula. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 194-
95, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 1600.
293. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 195-96, 295-97, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 1601-02, 1648-50. The amount of the grant allotted to an
eligible coastal state is determined through a complicated formula which takes
into account newly leased OCS acreage adjacent to the coastal state, the volume
of oil and natural gas produced from the adjacent OCS, and the volume of oil and
natural gas first landed in the coastal state. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(b) (2) (1982); 15
C.F.R. § 931.125(c)(1) (1983). The term "first landed" in a particular coastal state
refers to "oil and natural gas produced from the OCS that is first unloaded from
tankers or barges within that state, or is brought to shore in pipelines that first
touch non-submerged land and create a significant impact in that state." Id. at
§ 931.121(a). For calculations of formula grant allotments, OCS acreage and pro-
duction shall be considered "adjacent" to a particular coastal state if "such acre-
age and production lies on that state's side of the extended lateral seaward
boundaries of that state." Id. at § 931.80. Federal regulations governing the deter-
mination of lateral seaward boundaries for the purpose of calculating formula
grant allotments under the CEIP are located at 15 C.F.R. §§ 931.80-.85(1983). For a
The authorization level for formula grants was raised, with a
37% % ceiling on the amount that any single state may obtain in a
fiscal year,294 and a two percent minimum floor for each state
which is adjacent to OCS acreage newly leased or involved with
landing OCS oil and gas.2 9 5 A system for the proportional reduc-
tion in each state's allotment if sufficient funds are not available
in any fiscal years was included,296 and the chronological order for
disbursing grants to coastal states was clarified. 297 The Reagan
administration, however, has eliminated federal funding for CEIP
and the CZMAA program. 298
14. OCSLAA in General
The OCSLAA is intended to achieve a balance between expe-
dited development of OCS oil and gas resources and protection of
the coastal environment. According to one commentator, how-
ever, "the amendments have one glaring deficiency-the failure to
expedite OCS production."2 99 One study estimated that the OC-
SLAA could create additional delays of up to six years in develop-
ing OCS oil and gas resources. 30 0 The minority views of Congress
also expressed concern that certain provisions of the OCSLAA
would add unnecessary, costly, and time-consuming steps to
those now required to be taken before new production can be
made available to the public. 301
F. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)302 is the basic
discussion of the law applicable to lateral seaward boundaries, see Christie,
Coastal Energy Impact Program Boundaries on the Atlantic Coast: A Case Study
of the Law Applicable to Lateral Seaward Boundaries, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 841
(1979).
294. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(b) (3) (C) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 931.125(c) (4)(1983).
295. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(b) (3) (A) (i) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 931.125(c) (2) (1983).
296. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(b) (3) (B) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 931.125(c) (3) (1983).
297. 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(b) (3) (A) (1982).
298. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 6, at 285 (statement of
Michael Fisher, Executive Director, California Coastal Commission).
299. Comment, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978:
Balancing Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns?, supra note 190, at 204 (re-
marks by Congressman Moore).
300. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 217, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1622. For additional comment critical of the OCSLAA, see
Cole, supra note 190.
301. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 298-300, 313-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1651-53, 1665-67.
302. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For the legislative history of
NEPA, see H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 2751. For a discussion of NEPA and the OCSLA, see
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977); Comment,
Standards of Adequacy for an EIS for Off-Shore Leasing, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 667
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national charter for protection of the environment. It establishes
policy,3 03 sets goals, and provides means for carrying out the pol-
icy.3 04 NEPA requires all agencies of the federal government to
"identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will in-
sure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking
along with economic and technical considerations." 3 0 5 To imple-
ment the duty to consider environmental values in administrative
decision making, NEPA requires that all federal agencies prepare
a detailed EIS for all proposed "major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environments."3 0 6
(1978); Comment, USDI's Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sale in the Beaufort Sea
Contested, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 943 (1981); Noble, Oil and Gas Leasing on Public
Lands: NEPA Gets Lost in the Shuffle, 6 HARv. ENvTi. L. REV. 117 (1982).
303. The congressional purposes of NEPA are:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoya-
ble harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which
will prevent or elimina:e damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of
the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and
to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
304. In order to carry out the policy set forth in NEPA, Congress placed the re-
sponsibility upon the federal government to use all practicable means to improve
and coordinate federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that
the United States may:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the envi-
ronment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maxi-
mum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
Id. at § 4331(b).
305. Id. at § 4332(2) (B). For a discussion of federal agency responsibility under
NEPA, see Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National
Environmental Policy Act cf 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differ-
ential Response, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263 (1976); Cortner, A Case Analysis of Pol-
icy Implementation: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 323 (1976).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1976). For guidance on understanding the term
"major federal action," see 40 C.F.R §§ 1502.4, 1508.18 (1982). In determining
whether to prepare an EIS, the federal agency shall consider the factors listed in
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1982).
The Department of the Interior's procedures under NEPA in-
clude preparing an EIS and holding public hearings before the
Secretary decides whether specific tracts should be issued with
restrictions or stipulations.307 Therefore, an EIS is required at
each of three stages in the OCS leasing process 308 because the in-
formation necessary for a meaningful balance of environmental
impacts against the benefits of OCS oil and gas development in a
particular area is collected over a period of time. In the initial
stage, an EIS is prepared to examine the proposed OCS five-year
oil and gas leasing schedule. This EIS analyzes the environmen-
tal impacts estimated to result from the adoption of the five-year
leasing schedule. It will not be repeated unless new federal pol-
icy toward OCS development is adopted.
The second EIS is prepared before each individual OCS lease
sale. This EIS is general in scope, because it is not known where
and in what volume petroleum resources may be located. Basic
data are collected and analyzed which include the geology, cli-
mate, physical oceanography, biological environment, and natural
phenomena unique to the particular area of the proposed sale.309
Mitigating measures, alternative proposals, the technology neces-
sary for exploration, and possible onshore socioeconomic impacts
are also described in this EIS.310
The third EIS is prepared prior to development and production
of leased tracts within a particular area. The OCSLAA provides
that the approval of a development plan in any new area or region
is a major federal action within the meaning of NEPA and re-
quires the preparation of an EIS. This EIS need not be prepared
for each leased tract, but rather for each major new area where
development and production is about to occur.311
To accommodate the streamlined leasing process and the new
definition of sale area, the Interior Department has adopted a dif-
ferent approach to the preparation of environmental impact state-
ments. Essentially it involves the tiering of NEPA documents. 312
307. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 187, at 128-29; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1-.41506.6 (1982).
308. These stages were identified in Comment, The Outer Continental Shelf
Bridging the Information Gap Through Regulation, supra note 188, at 635-36.
309. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 186, at 51.
Specific data include the rate and flow of tide and currents, air and
water quality, seasonal temperatures and winds, the marine communities
of plants and aquatic life, wildlife of any island landmass in the specific
area, commercial and sport fishing, ship traffic, navigation, and military
uses, beach oriented and other forms of recreation.
Id.
310. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 35, at 62, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1469.
311. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)-1351(g) (Supp. V 1981).
312. Edwards, Reagan Administration Brings New Approach to Federal OCS
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The EIS prepared for the first offering in a planning area will em-
phasize analysis rather than description, and will provide an as-
sessment of expected cumulative effects of exploration and
development activity that might occur within the entire planning
area if all the petroleum resources in the planning area are devel-
oped. The NEPA document prepared for the second area-wide of-
fering will update the EIS for the first offering. Additional
information will include results of ongoing environmental studies
and monitoring projects as well as data from any exploration ac-
tivities that may have taken place.3 13
The NEPA process provides the federal policy-maker with suffi-
cient information to consider the environmental consequences of
a particular proposed action. NEPA procedures are intended to
provide environmental information to public officials and con-
cerned citizens before decisions are made and action is taken. 314
The NEPA requirement of an EIS for OCS leasing will create sig-
nificant delays because drafting an EIS usually takes from five to
ten months,3 15 and court challenges to the sufficiency of the EIS
cause further delays. 31 6
Litigation has slowed the accelerated OCS leasing programs ini-
Leasing, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981, 203, 208; OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2,
supra note 1, at 51 (statement of Interior Secretary James G. Watt); OCS Over-
sight Hearings-Part 3, supra note 62, at 27.
Tiering an EIS eliminates repetitive discussions of the same issues and focuses
on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental review. Tier-
ing is appropriate:
Whenever a broad environmental impact statement has been prepared
(such as a program or policy statement) and a subsequent statement or
environmental assessment is then prepared on an action included within
the entire program or jpolicy (such as a site specific action) the subse-
quent statement or environmental assessment need only summarize the
issues discussed in the broader statement and incorporate discussions
from the broader statement by reference and shall concentrate on the is-
sues specific to the subsequent action.
40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (1982).
313. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J.
Robinson West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget, and Administration,
United States Dep't of the Interior); FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS
LEASE SCHEDULE, supra note 205, at 20.
314. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b), (c) (1982).
315. H.R. REP. No. 590, upra note 35, at 62-63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1469-70.
316. Gendler, Offshore Oil Power Plays: Maximizing State Input into Federal
Resource Decisionmaking, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 347, 369 (1979). See COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS, IMPACT OF REGULATIONS-AFTER FEDERAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 41-47
(EMD 81-48) (Feb. 27, 1981).
tiated in the 1970's, affecting both the leasing of offshore lands and
subsequent exploration and development activities. An examina-
tion of the major court actions brought against OCS leasing and
development during the 1970's and 1980's reveals that the majority
of cases involved NEPA challenges. Failure to comply with the
OCSLA and its amendments was the second most cited offense,
with challenges based on Coastal Zone Management Act require-
ments cited to a lesser degree. Some cases have been resolved
quickly; others have gone on for two years. The fact that a partic-
ular sale or the program has been challenged produces uncer-
tainty in the leasing program. However, court decisions have
provided a certain amount of definition as to how the OCSLA and
other statutes applicable to offshore activities are to be
implemented. 317
G. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
In the late 1960's there was a general recognition that the
coastal areas of the United States represent some of our most val-
uable national assets. At the same time, the country became
aware of the intense pressures being applied to the coastal
zone,3 18 and the inability of local governments to cope with con-
flicting and competing coastal interests. 3 19
To achieve a rational balancing of competing pressures on
317. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS, PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S NEW ACCELLERATED OCS LEASING
6-7 (EMD 82-86) (Dec. 18, 1981).
318. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 1771 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 2771; 16 U.S.C. § 1451(b)
(1976). "The Coastal Zone is rich in a variety of natural, commercial, recreational,
industrial, and esthetic resources of immediate and potential value to the present
and future well-being of the nation." Id. S. REP. No. 277, supra, at 3, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1771; 16 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1982); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1451(f) (1982). See also Rettig, Some EconomicAspects of Conflicts Over Land
Use in the Coastal Zone, 1 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 291 (1974).
319. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1982).
The uses of valuable coastal areas generate issues of intense State and
local interest, but the effectiveness with which the resources of the coastal
zone are used and protected often is a matter of national importance.
Navigation and military uses of the coasts and waters offshore clearly are
direct Federal responsibilities; economic development, recreation, and
conservation interests are shared by the Federal Government and the
States.
Rapidly intensifying use of coastal areas already has outrun the capabil-
ities of local governments to plan their orderly development and to resolve
conflicts. The division of responsibilities among the several levels of gov-
ernment is unclear, and the knowledge and procedures for formulating
sound decisions are lacking.
The present Federal, State, and local machinery is inadequate.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES,
OuR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 49 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as OUR NATION AND THE SEA], reproduced in part in S. REP. No. 753, 92d
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coastal resources, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act (CZMA) in 1972.320 The CZMA was enacted to en-
courage and assist coastal states in developing and implementing
management programs to preserve, protect, develop, and where
possible, to restore or enhance the resources of our nation's
coasts by the exercise of planning and control over activities oc-
curring in their coastal zones. 321
The CZMA is a federal land and water use planning act which
authorizes the use of federal resources, both technical and
financial, to encourage and assist coastal states in the develop-
ment and operation of comprehensive management programs for
their coastal zones. 322 While cooperation in the coastal zone man-
agement program is voluntary on the part of the states, the Act
incorporates two incentives to encourage state participation. 323
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 7531, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4778.
320. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982). Passage of the CZMA in 1972 followed several
years of increasing concern about the destruction of valuable coastal wetlands and
beaches. National interest in recreation, estuarine protection, land use policy, and
the development of ocean resources also influenced the enactment of coastal man-
agement legislation. The publication of the Strattorn Commission report entitled
OuR NATION AND THE SEA, however, served as the catalyst for passage of coastal
zone management legislation. The report, released in 1969, recommended that "a
Coastal Management Act be enacted which will provide policy objectives for the
coastal zone and authorize Federal grants-in-aid to facilitate the establishment of
State Coastal Zone Authorities empowered to manage the coastal waters and adja-
cent land." OuR NATION AND THE SEA, supra note 319, at 57, reproduced in H.R.
REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 4371. For a discussion of the divergent interests which contributed
to the development of coastal zone management legislation, see S. REP. No. 753,
supra note 319, at 308, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 4776-82; S.
REP. No. 277, supra note 317, at 208, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
at 1769-75; H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra, at 22-33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 4370-83.
For a discussion of coastal zone management legislation, see Hershman &
Folkenroth, Coastal Zone Management and Intergovernmental Coordination, 54
OR. L. REV. 13 (1975); Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to
Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159 (1982); Kuer-
steiner, Sullivan, & Temin, Protecting Our Coastal Interests: A Policy Proposal for
Coordinating Coastal Zone Management, National Defense, and the Federal
Supremacy Doctrine, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 705 (1980); Moore, Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Development and Recent Applications of the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1971, 15 TULSA L.J. 443 (1980).
321. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1982). For a discussion of developing the technical
support for coastal zone management, see Russell & Kneese, Establishing the Sci-
entific, Technical, and Economic Basis for Coastal Zone Management, 1 COASTAL
ZONE MGMT. J. 47 (1973).
322. 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982).
323. Rubin, The Role of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 in the Devel-
First, two types of federal funding are made available to coastal
states. The federal government will fund up to eighty percent of
the cost of developing and administering a coastal zone manage-
ment program. 324 Federal grants are also available through the
Coastal Energy Impact Program to assist coastal states in plan-
ning for and financing public facilities and public services re-
quired as a result of OCS energy activity.325 Second, the CZMA
provides that once a state's plan is approved by the Secretary of
Commerce, federal activities that affect the state's coastal zone
must be consistent with the state's approved coastal zone man-
agement plan.326
The most significant part of the CZMA for OCS oil and gas pur-
poses is the consistency requirement.327 The federal activities
subject to the consistency provisions include: (1) activities con-
ducted or supported by a federal agency and directly affecting the
coastal zone;328 (2) federal development projects in the coastal
zone;329 (3) activities of applicants for federal licenses or permits
where the proposed activities will affect land or water in the
coastal zone;330 (4) plans for the "exploration or development of,
or production from, any area which has been leased under the
[OCSLA]" that affects land or water in the coastal zone;331 and
(5) federal programs which provide funding to state and local gov-
ernments for projects which will affect the coastal zone.332
The most important consistency provision governs exploration,
development, or production plans. This provision provides that
after approval of the state coastal zone management program, any
person submitting an OCS exploration, development, or produc-
opment of Oil and Gas from the Outer Continental Shelf 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
399, 405 (1975); Comment, Federal Consistency and Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Gas Leasing: The Application of the "Directly Affecting" Test to Pre-Lease
Sale Activities, 9 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 431 (1980).
324. 16 U.S.C. § 1455a(d)(1) (1982).
325. Id. at § 1456a(a)(1), (b)(5)(B).
326. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982). The regulations implementing the federal con-
sistency requirement are codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.1-.145(1983).
327. For a discussion of the consistency provision, see Di Mento, Improving De-
velopment Control Through Planning: The Consistency Doctrine, 5 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1978); Williamson, Federal Lands and Consistency: An Intergovern-
mental Planning Proposal for the Coastal Zone, 4 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 435
(1978); Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract
Selections and Lease Stipulations be Consistent with State Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Programs?, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 105 (1980). The major federal court case inter-
preting the consistency provision is California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal.
1981), affid in part, rev'd in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
328. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.30-.44 (1983).
329. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(2) (1982).
330. Id. at § 1456(c) (3) (A); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.50-.66 (1983).
331. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.70-.86(1983).
332. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(d) (1982); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.90-.100 (1983).
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tion plan to the Secretary of the Interior for approval must, with
respect to the activities described in the exploration, develop-
ment, or production plan and affecting the coast, certify that each
activity complies with the state's coastal management program.
No federal licenses or permits required for any activity described
in the exploration, development, or production plan may be
granted until the state has satisfied itself that the activity is con-
sistent. The state has six months in which to object to the certifi-
cation or its concurrence is conclusively presumed. If the state
objects to the activities described in the exploration, develop-
ment, or production plan, the Secretary of Commerce may over-
ride the objection if each activity described in the plan is
consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or is necessary in the
interest of national security. If the state concurs or the Secretary
of Commerce overrides the state's objections to the proposed ac-
tivities, then no further consistency determinations are required
for any activity described in detail in the exploration, develop-
ment, or production carried out in accordance with the plan. If a
state's objection is not overridden or activities are not conducted
in accordance with the submitted plan, then a new or amended
plan must be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior and the
state has only three months in which to notify the Secretary of
the Interior of its objections.3 3 3
H. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
Congressional concern about rapidly deteriorating fish, wildlife,
and plant habitats, and increasing numbers of species becoming
extinct and threatened with extinction resulted in a series of leg-
islative actions culminating in the enactment of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA).334 The ESA was enacted to provide a
333. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (3) (B) (1982).
334. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). The ESA was the result of the congressional
finding that:
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and develop-
ment untempered by adequate concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in
numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the nation and
its people.
16 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1)-(3) (1982).
For the legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, see S. REP. No. 307,
program for the protection of endangered and threatened spe-
cies, 3 3 5 and the conservation of the ecosystems on which endan-
gered and threatened species depend. 336 The primary purpose of
the ESA "is to prevent animal and plant species endangerment
and extinction caused by man's influence on ecosystems, and to
return the species to the point where they are viable components
of their ecosystems." 337
The principal substantive import of the ESA for OCS purposes
is the requirement that the Secretary of the Interior insure that
"agency action" is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of an endangered or threatened species, or its critical habitat.338
A "consultation" process is outlined whereby the agency with ju-
risdiction over the endangered species issues to the Secretary of
the Interior a "biological opinion" examining the nature and ex-
tent of the impact on that species by the proposed agency ac-
tion.3 39 The "irreversible or irretrievable" commitment of
resources is forbidden with respect to the agency action if the in-
vestment would foreclose reasonable and prudent alternative
measures and violate the ESA.340
The provisions of the ESA apply to OCSLA lease sales and all
resulting activities conducted under the OCSLA.341 The ESA ap-
plies to major actions taken by the Secretary of the Interior after
the lease sale is held. Therefore, any contract which the Secre-
tary enters into (and any OCS oil and gas lease) which requires
further action by the Secretary (approval of plans) will contain,
as an implied term, a condition that the Secretary will not violate
the ESA.342 Thus, if the Secretary determines that a lessee's OCS
exploration or development and production plan will jeopardize
an endangered or threatened species or its critical habitat, the
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 2989;
H.R. REP. No. 823, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 1685.
335. The Act provides five criteria for determining whether a species is endan-
gered or threatened: "(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range; (2) overutilization for commercial, sporting, sci-
entific, or educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the inadequacy of ex-
isting regulatory mechanisms; or (5) other natural or manmade factors affecting
its continued existence." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (1982).
336. Id. at § 1531 (b)-(c).
337. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 335, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 9455.
338. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1982).
339. Id. at § 1536(b).
340. Id. at § 1536(d).
341. Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 715 (1st Cir. 1979); Cali-
fornia v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. at 1386-87; North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp.
332, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1979).
342. 623 F.2d at 715.
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proposal will not be allowed to proceed.343
1. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)344 was enacted in
1972 for the purpose of ensuring that marine mammals are main-
tained at healthy population levels.3 45 In passing the MMPA,
Congress responded to the growing concern about the decline of
certain marine mammal species, 34 6 and recognized the important
role that marine mammals play in the ecosystem as well as their
economic, aesthetic, and recreational value.34 7 The MMPA estab-
lished a moratorium on the taking of marine mammals unless the
population of an animal is determined to be at its optimum sus-
tainable level. 348
The significant provision of the MMPA, as it relates to OCS oil
and gas development, is the provision "that efforts should be
made to protect the rookeries, mating grounds, and areas of simi-
lar significance for each species of marine mammal from the ad-
verse effect of man's actions. ' 349 Federal courts have interpreted
this provision to apply to OCS lease activity. The federal govern-
ment "must proceed with caution to ensure that agency action
does not eventually violate the [MMPA]. "350
The ESA, OCSLA, and the MMPA all authorize the Secretary of
the Interior to monitor activities taking place under OCS leases
on an ongoing basis and to suspend any such activity which jeop-
ardizes the environment.351 The MMPA and ESA also require the
Secretary to prevent harm to protected wildlife. The MMPA and
the ESA forbid any person to "take" a marine mammal or endan-
gered species of fish or wildlife from waters within the jurisdic-
343. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982).
344. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982). For the legislative history of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, see H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4144; H.R. REP. No. 228, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 1458.
345. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2), (6) (1982).
346. Id. at § 1361(1).
347. Id. at § 1361(6).
348. Id. at § 1371.
349. Id. at § 1361(2).
350. 486 F. Supp. at 361-62.
351. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982) (ESA); 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1)(B), (2)(A)
(Supp. V 1981) (OCSLA); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(2), 1372 (1982) (MMPA); North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
tion of the United States.352
Plaintiffs have also sought to enjoin OCS lease sales by arguing
that a "taking" under the MMPA and the ESA would result from
the leasing of certain offshore tracts. In California v. Watt, 353 the
State of California and the Natural Resources Defense Council re-
quested injunctive relief enjoining the Department of the Interior
from offering for competitive bidding in OCS lease sale No. 53 cer-
tain oil and gas leases on tracts located in the Santa Maria Basin,
offshore California. Plaintiffs argued that an unlawful "taking"
under the ESA and MMPA would result from the leasing of tracts
in the northern Santa Maria Basin. The court rejected plaintiff's
ESA and MMPA argument, and concluded that Lease Sale No. 53
did not violate the taking prohibition of the ESA or the MMPA.
The court reasoned: "Assuming arguendo that the proposed leas-
ing activities do constitute a threat to the continued survival of
species protected by these statutes, such a threat would still not
constitute a 'taking' under the statutes." 354
However, in North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 355 representatives
of environmental organizations and native Alaskans brought suit
to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from carrying out an OCS
lease sale off the north coast of Alaska in the Beaufort Sea. Plain-
tiffs argued that the lease sale violated the "taking" provisions of
the ESA and the MMPA. They asserted that offshore petroleum
development would threaten the existence of the Bowhead whale,
an endangered species hunted by the Inupiat Eskimo. In the
North Slope Borough case, the court did conclude that the taking
provisions of the ESA and the MMPA obligated the Secretary of
the Interior to ensure that OCS lease activity did not become
prejudicial to protected wildlife. The court held, however, that the
Secretary had fulfilled the mandate of the ESA and MMPA and
refused to enjoin the lease sale.356 If the lessee's OCS operations
become harmful to wildlife, the Secretary must sue to enjoin or
prosecute for a "taking."35 7
J. The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
352. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1) (1982); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), (C) (1982). The
MMPA defines the term "take" to mean "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or to at-
tempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine animal." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(19)
(1982).
353. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (1981).
354. Id. at 1387-88.
355. 642 F.2d at 595 (1980).
356. Id.
357. Id.
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(MPRSA), passed in 1972,358 has influenced offshore oil and gas
development by its control of two ocean activities. The MPRSA
authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regu-
late the dumping of all materials into ocean waters through estab-
lishment of a permit program for such ocean dumping.35 9 This
would include any waste materials transported from an OCS drill-
ing site to another ocean area for purposes of disposal.360 The
Marine Sanctuaries Program was also established and is adminis-
tered by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration.36 1 The Secretary of Commerce, with
presidential approval, is authorized to designate areas of the
ocean and certain other waters as marine sanctuaries for the pur-
pose of "preserving or restoring such areas for their conservation,
recreational, ecological, or aesthetic values." 362
The most significant aspect of the MPRSA for OCS purposes is
the authorization to designate portions of the OCS as marine
sanctuaries which would give the Secretary of Commerce author-
ity to issue and enforce regulations controlling activities within
the sanctuary. The Secretary of Commerce "could exercise this
power to exclude all drilling operation [within the sanctuary] and
otherwise take steps to conserve and protect the natural re-
sources of the region."363 Environmental organizations, coastal
358. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). For the legislative history of the MPRSA, see S. REP. No. 451, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 4234; H.R.
REP. No. 325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 3262; H.R. REP. No. 894, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 2572.
359. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1421 (1976). The EPA regulations governing ocean dump-
ing pursuant to the MPRSA are codified at 40 C.F.R §§ 220.1-231.8 (1982).
360. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 1, supra note 6, at 248-49 (statement of R.
Sarah Compton, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water Enforcement
and Permits, Environmental Protection Agency).
361. 16 U.S.C. § 1431-1434 (1982).
362. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1982). Marine sanctuaries may be designated "as far
seaward as the outer edge of the Continental Shelf, as defined in the [1958 Ge-
neva] Convention on the Continental Shelf ... [in] other coastal waters where
the tide ebbs and flows, or [in] the Great Lakes and their connecting waters." Id.
363. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884-85 (1st Cir. 1979). For example,
the Key Largo Coral Reef off the coast of Florida was permanently withdrawn
from OCS mineral leasing and designated a preserve by presidential proclamation
issued on March 17, 1960. After MPRSA was enacted, the Key Largo Reef was des-
ignated a marine sanctuary. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES GENERAL Ac-
COUTING OFFICE, MARINE SANCTUARIES PROGRAM OFFERS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND BENEFITS OTHER LAWS Do NOT 12-13 (CED 81-37) (Mar. 4, 1981).
For an illustration of the types of activities prohibited within marine sanctuaries,
states, and native Alaskans have sought to enjoin OCS lease sales
by relying upon MPRSA. Although federal courts have refused to
enjoin the proposed sale of OCS oil and gas leases on MPRSA
grounds, the courts have held that an EIS prepared in connection
with such an OCS sale should discuss the possible applicability of
the MPRSA. The EIS discussion of alternatives must include the
possible management of the OCS region as a marine sanctuary.
This would include focusing attention upon the question of
whether or not there are any portions of the proposed OCS sale
area that are so uniquely valuable that they should be identified
for special protective status as a marine sanctuary.364 The marine
sanctuaries program has also been used by the executive branch
to prohibit offshore oil and gas development. The focus of the
marine sanctuaries program was significantly changed during the
Carter administration from a program whose purpose was to pro-
mote marine research to one utilized to restrict OCS petroleum
development. 365
Although development of OCS petroleum resources is con-
ducted pursuant to numerous federal laws, there are three major
statutes which govern the development of OCS resources. The
OCSLA delegates authority over the OCS to the Department of
the Interior and prescribes the manner in which the Interior De-
partment may develop OCS energy resources. The CZMA re-
quires certain activities to be conducted consistent with state
management programs developed under the CZMA and subjects
other proposed activities to scrutiny by the affected coastal state
before OCS lessees may proceed pursuant to permits from the
Department of the Interior. Finally, NEPA requires federal agen-
cies to evaluate the environmental consequences of a proposed
action and to prepare an EIS before proceeding with the proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has considered the natural conflict which arises
when the federal government increases its efforts to lease acreage
on the OCS for energy development. Although the nation as a
whole reaps the benefits of increased production of domestic en-
as well as the regulations governing the Key Largo Coral Reef Marine Sanctuary,
see 15 C.F.R §§ 929.1-.9 (1983).
364. 594 F.2d 872, 884-86; 486 F. Supp. 332, 349.
365. In the closing days of the Carter administration, four sanctuaries were des-
ignated, and oil and gas operations were prohibited in two of them. Schenke, The
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act: The Conflict Between Marine
Protection and Oil and Gas Development, 18 Hous. L. REV. 987, 1015 (1981). See
also Blumm and Blumstein, The Marine Sanctuaries Program: A Framework for
Critical Areas Management in the Sea, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 50016
(1978).
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ergy sources, local interests may be subject to negative environ-
mental and economic impacts as a result. The potential negative
effects have led coastal states to seek a greater voice in federal
OCS decisions. Several opportunities exist for local involvement
in such decisions, but such involvement tends to delay the rate of
exploitation which the federal government seeks.
Although the makers of national policy' on OCS development
have seen the participation of coastal zone states in the planning
process as vital to its success, the Department of the Interior,
under the auspices of former Secretary James Watt, determined
that the national interest in rapid exploitation of OCS resources
outweighed the coastal states' concerns. 366 It is anticipated that
neither Mr. Watt's resignation nor the appointment of William P.
Clark to the Secretary of the Interior position will change this pol-
icy. 367 While the development of the OCS has been the subject of
recent legislation, it is apparent that the courts will be the final
arbiters of preserving a delicate balance between the competing
concerns of national and local interests.
ADDENDUM
The United States Supreme Court on January 11, 1984 an-
nounced its 5-4 decision interpreting the CZMA's requirements for
state involvement in federal OCS lease sales. The Court held that
the Department of the Interior's sales are not an activity directly
affecting the coastal Zone within the meaning of the CZMA and,
therefore, a consistency review is not required before making such
sales. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 52 U.S.L.W. 4063
(U.S. Jan. 10, 1984). Among other reasons the Court noted that
Congress has distinguished between the sale of a lease and the
later stages of exploration, development, and production where
state input is required. While this new decision appears to be a
victory for pro-development forces, only time will tell whether the
announced intention of new Secretary of the Interior, William
Clark, to reduce emphasis of OCS development will have a greater
impact.
366. See supra note 21.
367. See Dimento, Dozer, Emmons, Hagman, Kim, Greenfield-Sanders, Waldau
& Woollacott, Land Development and Environmental Control in the California
Supreme Court: The Differential, the Preservationis and the Preservationist-Er-
ratic Eras, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 859, 882, 918 n.435, 923 n.465 (1980).
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